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ABSTRACT
A TEST OF THE IDEAL FREE DISTRIBUTION IN PANHANDLING HUMANS
by
Le’Ann Milinder 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2002
The Ideal Free Distribution (Fretwell and Lucas,1970), an optimization model from 
behavioral ecology, predicts that a group of animals will distribute themselves across habitats 
with unequal resources such that all animals have equal success rates. The six experiments 
of this dissertation demonstrated that humans conform to the IFD with about the same 
sensitivity as animals and respond similarly when assumptions of the model are violated. 
The present study also revealed that cooperation, and its effect on the functional size of 
the foraging unit, may be an important factor in understanding the distribution of social 
foragers.
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the IFD could be applied to groups o f humans 
foraging in spatially separated habitats. The distribution of a group was examined in a 
simulated panhandling situation, where foragers could obtain nickels by asking for them on 
two streets with varying ratios o f resources. The distributions o f panhandlers in 
Experiments 1 and 2 were comparable to those found with animal subjects.
Experiments 3, 4, and 5 varied the degree to which the model’s assumptions 
(perfect knowledge, equal competitive weight, and lack of interference from other 
competitors) were met in the panhandling situation. As predicted by findings with non-
viii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
human animals, violations o f these assumptions disrupted the IFD.
Experiment 6 examined the effect of cooperation on the distribution of panhandlers. 
When a high density of panhandlers foraged cooperatively, they distributed according to 
the IFD. The same number, working individually, did not. This manipulation showed 
that consideration o f the size o f the foraging unit may be important in determining 
whether a distribution fits the IFD.
Additional data analyses from all six experiments revealed strategies that may 
provide the mechanism by which a group of animals achieves the IFD. Two effective 
strategies were identified, although no strong evidence was found for the primacy o f one 
strategy over the other, or for a particular combination o f strategies needed to produce 
the IFD. An examination o f the characteristics of individual panhandlers ruled out a 
number o f individual differences as the basis for changes in the distribution of the group.
ix
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Humans occupy every continent on earth. The spread o f humans over the planet 
since the evolution o f homo sapiens has shaped both the ecosystems in which humans 
live and the human cultures that have evolved. Diamond (1999) has proposed that the 
interaction o f humans with opportunities and challenges offered by their different 
environments is the best explanation o f vast cultural and political differences between 
peoples. Diamond argues convincingly that technological and political triumphs o f one 
culture over another can be predicted by differences attributable to the habitats in which 
these cultures developed. The natural resources within the immediate environment, such 
as wild species o f nutritious grains suitable for cultivation, or large mammals amenable 
to domestication, provided the environmental building blocks for the cultural evolution 
o f farming and resource-storing economies. These economic changes made more 
elaborate political systems both possible and necessary. Geographic features such as 
intervening mountains, plains, deserts, or pathways to cultures with similar climactic 
constraints sometimes slowed and sometimes sped the spread o f humans. The 
technologies, germs, and cultural practices they carried with them led to new varieties o f 
practice in receiving cultures, occasionally decimating those populations and 
transforming the ecosystem. Movement between habitats would appear to be a crucial 
phenomenon in the natural history o f man.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The need to explain the habitat choices and exploitation currently taking place on 
the planet may be even more compelling. Diamond pointed out that humans arriving in 
habitats previously devoid o f man may have been responsible for rapid elimination o f 
large mammals. As a result, these populations failed to develop animal husbandry unless 
the practice was imported from other cultures. When these populations were isolated 
geographically, the lack o f large mammals appeared to impair the development of 
technology. The rapid destruction o f ecosystems may similarly effect the development 
o f present human cultures. More importantly, we are now faced with the realization that 
this practice is not sustainable, given that humans already occupy virtually all o f the 
globe. Environments that are unoccupied, or lightly exploited by, humans are 
increasingly recognized as essential in the broader environments that encompass the 
ecosystems in which all species, including our own, endure (Turmer & Gardener, 1995; 
Daily & Ehrlich, 1992). Thus, the question o f why populations distribute themselves 
across habitats the way they do becomes an important social, as well as historical, 
question.
One assumption of Diamond’s account appears to be that if  people can move 
from one habitat to another, they will. One might justify this assumption by arguing that 
wherever it has been possible for humans to inhabit an area, they have. Perhaps, then, 
movement between habitats is so ubiquitous that it needs no explanation. Yet, consider 
Dawkins’s (1982) question, “Are there important facts about life that we hardly notice 
simply because we lack the imagination to visualise alternatives which. . .  might have 
existed in some possible world?” (p.3). If one is to accept Diamond’s notion that 
diversity among environments gave rise to the variety o f  cultures and the resultant history
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o f man, than imagining a world in which people do not necessarily move around much 
would paint a vastly different picture o f the globe and the human race than we see today. 
How might we address the question o f why humans choose to move from one habitat to 
another?
One way might be to explore the cultural determinants o f movement between 
habitats. One predominant view of human migration is that population movement is the 
result o f rational individual choice based on economic, specifically employment, 
motives, without a role for the environment per se as a causal variable (Stark, 1991; 
Bilsborrow, 1991). Blaut (1999, 1994) argued against the role o f the environment in the 
formation and diffusion o f  cultural practices as well as the diffusion o f peoples. Rather, 
he attributed the diffusion o f both culture and people, particularly in relation to the 
dominance of Europe, to cultural forces such as colonialism (which he argued cannot be 
tied to environmental causes.) Diamond also made the argument that cultural 
differences in technology and practice allowed some groups of humans to move rapidly 
from one environment to another (e.g. because of the building of boats) or to successfully 
displace other humans from a habitat (e.g. because of the germs they harbored as a result 
o f keeping domesticated animals.) However, Diamond’s approach to the development o f 
culture is a selectionist one that gives primacy to the environment: those cultural 
practices that lead to advantages within a given environment will persist and those that 
do not will disappear. Any given environment will shape the behavior o f  the humans 
living in it, such that social practices and technology will reflect the resources and 
constraints present. Thus, the environment determines o f the distribution of peoples. As 
environments change or people move, practices may be developed or discarded. When
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behavioral change does not occur quickly enough, the particular group o f humans may be 
wiped out entirely. Combined with imitation o f new practices introduced by others 
(whether native innovators or immigrants), behavioral selection by consequences in the 
local environment is the mechanism by which cultures adapt and exchange technology 
and practice.
Even before the existence of homo sapiens, previous species of the genus homo 
began spreading from the African continent two million years ago into Asia and later into 
Europe (Corballis, 1999). According to a widely held view, homo sapiens originated in 
Africa 100-150,000 years ago and began migrating to other continents within a few 
thousand years (Cavalli-Sforza, et al. 1993). Clearly, these proto-humans and humans 
could and did move consistently from one habitat to another. Yet, these early migrants 
had few o f the elaborate cultural practices to which migration is often attributed, with 
spoken language only appearing in homo sapiens and sophisticated manufacturing of 
tools and artifacts taking a leap forward only as recently as 35,000 - 40,000 years ago 
(Corballis, 1999). Perhaps, humans and proto-humans moved in response to what has 
been referred to as the push of population pressure (Kosinski & Prothero, 1975).
However, what determines the carrying capacity of a particular habitat and the most 
advantageous response of any organism to increases above that capacity is a question of 
adaptation. It would seem, therefore, that movement between habitats may be in part 
determined by a more basic evolutionary adaptation. Accordingly, we may look for an 
answer to why humans move between habitats in a more general adaptation for solving 
the problems facing all organisms that disperse across multiple habitats. A logical 
starting point for this exploration may be the field o f behavioral ecology, which seeks to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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understand the adaptive value o f behavior. Since variability in resources and conditions 
within and across habitats is often the norm, organisms populating changing or unevenly 
suitable environments are likely to be endowed with the capacity to determine the best 
choice of habitat on an ongoing basis. A mathematical model for predicting the 
distribution of a population across unequal habitats, the Ideal Free Distribution (Fretwell 
& Lucas, 1970), was originally proposed to describe the dispersion o f birds living in a 
seasonal environment. This model has since been tested extensively on non-human 
animals, successfully predicting population distributions in a variety of species and 
habitat types.
This dissertation represents an attempt at addressing the question o f how humans 
distribute themselves spatially across habitats. I report a series of six experiments which 
test the applicability of the Ideal Free Distribution to the movement of human foragers. 
The model tested in this dissertation is an optimization model based in behavioral ecology, 
but the methods rest squarely on the shoulders o f behavior analysis. Interpretation of the 
results relies on vantage points in both o f these disciplines. The following sections review 
several areas of the literature. I begin with optimization models, the Ideal Free Distribution 
in particular, and their application to humans. I then report on operant models o f foraging in 
order to highlight methodological limitations o f previous work on the Ideal Free Distribution 
and the rationale for the procedures used in the current study.
Optimization Models in Behavioral Ecology 
Optimization models have been used since the 1960s by behavioral ecologists to 
describe and predict animal behavior as diverse as clutch size in birds, patch residence times, 
optimal diet, and population distributions (Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990; Schoener, 1987).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Optimization is based on the notion that natural selection favors individuals whose behavior 
contributes to increased long-term reproductive success (fitness) compared to other 
individuals. With continued selection pressure, behavior will tend toward optimality as long 
as the context for the behavior is unchanged. By specifying a fitness-related currency to be 
optimized, as well as plausible strategies an animal might pursue and the payoffs for those 
strategies, a model can predict an optimal strategy for the circumstances. Observed behavior 
can then be used to test the assumptions about adaptation on which the model is based. The 
goal of optimization models is not to prove that animals behave optimally, but rather to use 
the models to understand adaptation in a particular circumstance (Foley, 1985; Parker & 
Maynard Smith, 1990).
Two widely tested models that predict individual behavior are the optimal diet 
model and the marginal value theorem. The optimal diet model (Schoener, 1971; 
Chamov, 1976a) makes assumptions about travel, search, handling, energy gain, and 
encounter rate to predict when prey items o f different quality will be consumed. The 
marginal value theorem (Chamov, 1976b) predicts that the optimal time to leave a patch 
is when the marginal net rate of energy gain for foraging in the patch drops below the 
average net rate of energy gain in other patches, after accounting for travel time. These and 
other optimization models of foraging have enjoyed qualitative (but not always quantitative) 
success in both field studies and laboratory experiments utilizing operant techniques 
(Shettleworth, 1988).
Behavioral ecologists have also set out to understand the behavioral mechanisms that 
allow animals to perform optimally. Cheverton, Kacelnick, and Krebs (1985) argued that 
knowledge o f mechanisms gained from operant experiments allows more realistic constraint
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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assumptions to be added to optimal foraging models. Because models often use complex 
calculations to determine optimal performance in a particular circumstance, one proposal is 
that animals use simple rules of thumb to approximate optimal performance. For example, a 
typical rule for explaining when an animal leaves a patch involves giving up time (GUT) a 
period of failing to encounter prey that signals the animal to leave the patch. Ydenberg 
(1984) showed that the rule observed in a given situation may depend on the schedule in 
effect Great tits working on a progressive random-ratio schedule followed a GUT rule, but 
birds on a progressive fixed ratio left immediately after reinforcement. Because initial 
responses after a reinforcer never resulted in energy gain, waiting for a run of bad luck before 
leaving had no advantage. Mitchell and Brener (1997) showed that giving-up rules need 
not be time-based. They found that rats were sensitive to work costs (as opposed to time 
or response costs) of food in determining whether a food patch was exhausted.
Other strategies have been proposed for circumstances in which animals compete 
with other foragers. Maynard Smith (1982) used the theory o f games to explain individual 
foraging behavior when the payoff for an individual depends on the behavior of other 
animals. When animals compete for resources, the payoff depends on the outcome of 
contests between the individual and a competitor (or the whole field of competitors). 
According to optimal foraging theory, the individual should adopt a strategy that maximizes 
the gains received as a result o f the contest Maynard Smith defined the evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS) as a strategy that, when adopted by every member of the population, cannot 
be invaded by a better strategy. Thus, although payoff still depends on what others do, the 
ESS results in every individual receiving the same gain in fitness. The ESS can take several 
forms, pure, conditional, or mixed. In a pure ESS, all members of the population follow the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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same strategy. In a conditional strategy, different behaviors may be specified for different 
circumstances. In a mixed ESS, different strategies appear within the population in a fixed 
proportion, and the net payoff for each strategy is the same.
The Ideal Free Distribution 
The Ideal Free Distribution (IFD) is an optimal foraging model initially proposed by 
Fretwell and Lucas in 1970 to predict distributions o f bird populations across habitats o f 
unequal "suitability." The model predicts that animals will distribute themselves across 
unequal habitats in such a way that all animals have equal success rates across the unequal 
habitats. The model has four assumptions (Fretwell, 1972; Kennedy & Gray, 1993): (1) 
animals act to optimize foraging efficiency; (2) animals have perfect knowledge about 
resource profitabilities in different habitats; (3) animals are of equal competitive abilities; 
and (4) individual intake decreases with increased population density in the habitats. The 
original conception of the IFD also did not incorporate the impact of travel between habitats 
or interference by other animals.
Quantitatively, the distribution across two habitats predicted by the IFD can be 
described by the following equation:
_^ L = A (1)
N3 Rt
where N, and N2 are the numbers of organisms in Habitats 1 and 2, and Ri and R2 are the 
amounts o f resources obtained in those habitats. This relation has also been termed "habitat 
matching" (Pulliam & Caraco, 1984). The model is typically applied to continuous-input 
foraging situations, in which prey items arrive singly and are captured as they arrive. The 
model has been widely and successfully tested with nonhuman animal species (primarily fish
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
and birds) in field experiments (e.g. Milinski, 1979; Recer et al.,1987; Harper, 1982) as well 
as in the laboratory (e.g. Gillis & Kramer, 1987; Baum & Kraft, 1998).
Despite its successes, the model has encountered some systematic difficulties. 
Methods for assessing the degree to which a particular distribution o f  animals approximates 
the IFD have varied from study to study, leading to some disagreement about the success of 
the model. Kennedy and Gray (1993) utilized a generalized IFD equation analogous to the 
generalized matching law (Baum, 1974) to assess the fit o f a given distribution to the 
predicted ratio. [See also Fagan (1987)]. This deviation is quantified by the parameter s, the 
slope of the straight line relating the log of the population ratio to the log of the resource 
ratio:
The parameter 5 reflects sensitivity to the differences between the resources at the two sites. 
The parameter b reflects bias toward one site or the other that is unaccounted for by the 
resource ratio. When the rich sites are underutilized, s is less than 1, a situation analogous to 
undermatching in the distribution of individual choice behavior (Baum, 1974). When j  is 
greater than 1, the lean sites are underutilized, and the situation is analogous to 
overmatching.
Kennedy and Gray re-analyzed data from a wide variety of IFD studies using the 
generalized equation. They found that in 44 of the 52 studies, relatively more animals were 
present in the poorer sites than predicted. Explanations offered to account for these 
systematic deviations from the IFD suggest that the IFD is not robust to violations of its 
assumptions. For example, Abrahams (1986) suggested that undermatching is likely to occur
(2)
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when animals have imperfect knowledge o f the differences between the resources in the two 
sites. If animals are unable to discriminate between resource profitabilities, they randomly 
choose between habitats until the difference between the profitabilities becomes 
discriminable. Houston and McNamara (1988) demonstrated that when competitors are 
unequal, undermatching was likely to occur if better competitors forced proportionally 
poorer competitors out of the rich habitat and into the lean habitat Grand (1997) showed 
how the observed undermatching of groups with unequal competitors could be improved by 
adjusting the distribution to reflect the relative competitive weights. Gillis and Kramer 
(1987) found decreased sensitivity as the density of foragers increased, an effect they 
attributed to interference.
Optimization Models and Human Behavior 
Behavior analysts have long sought general principles of behavior that transcend 
species. Optimization models, with their basis in evolutionary theory, are a natural point of 
intersection between behavioral ecology and behavior analysis. Optimal foraging theory 
provides a basis for potential continuity across species of the applicability of general models.
Optimization models have been little examined in human populations. Hackenberg 
(1998) reports that of the models that have been tested, some have been successful. For 
example, the optimal diet model (MacArthur & Pianka, 1966; Chamov, 1976) has received 
qualitative support in human field research, predicting prey utilization among the Ache' 
Indians of Paraguay (Hawkes, Hill, & O'Connell, 1982) and the Inujjuamiut Eskimos of 
eastern Canada (Smith, 1991). A laboratory study by Stockhorst (1984) also confirmed the 
predictions of the optimal diet model, most compellingly the counter-intuitive prediction that 
increasing the availability of a lower quality prey will not increase the probability of that prey
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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being taken when encountered. The marginal value theorem (Chamov, 1976), which 
predicts patch residence time, has also been examined in humans. Jacobs and Hackenberg 
(1996) showed that, within the narrow constraints o f concurrent progressive and fixed 
interval schedules, human subjects' performance was in general accord with the marginal 
value theorem’s predictions for leaving a depleting patch. Edwards and Josephson (1994) 
reanalyzed previously reported data and found that residence time in a field for herdsman 
grazing cattle was partly described by the marginal value theorem.
Until recently, the only test of the ideal free distribution in humans was a study of 
archival data of whalers foraging in the Pacific Ocean in the period 1830-1850 (Whitehead & 
Hope, 1991). Estimating takes of whale oil and locations of vessels from ships’ logs, 
Whitehead and Hope found that during the period 1835-1850, the distribution of whalers 
appeared to be in qualitative agreement with the Ideal Free Distribution. However, Kennedy 
and Gray (1993) reanalyzed their data using the generalized form of the equation and found 
that the slope, or sensitivity, measure was 2.42 in one condition, and .41 in the other, both 
substantial deviations from the IFD.
In the only published experimental study of the IFD in humans, Sokolowski,
Tonneau, and Baque (1999) found that humans engaged in a discrete-trials simulation of 
habitat choice approached the IFD, but substantially undermatched (slopes o f about .7).
Their experiment carefully controlled for conditions related to the assumptions of the IFD. 
First, money was awarded only to the person with the most points, ensuring an optimization 
strategy. Second, points were awarded in full view o f all participants, making it likely that 
the distribution o f resources was obvious by the final few trials o f each condition. Third, 
participants from each "habitat" who were to receive points were selected at random, so that
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having made a choice for a particular habitat, there were no differences in competitive 
abilities. Fourth, a limited number of points was distributed to occupants of a habitat, so 
increased numbers decreased the return for each forager in the habitat Finally, participants 
selected and switched habitats by holding up a card, minimizing any possible travel costs. 
Therefore, the “violations of assumptions” explanations offered for deviations from the IFD 
appear inadequate to explain these results. However, the assumption of perfect knowledge 
may have been violated if subjects were not able to remember and calculate perfectly. 
Sokolowski et al. proposed the humans were sensitive, not to wins alone in each habitat, but 
also to losses in each habitat, and suggested that the tactic pursued by humans foragers in this 
situation was to avoid the habitat with the most losing tokens.
Kraft (1999) found additional evidence for the conformance of the distribution o f 
group choice to the IFD. In a task similar to that of Sokolowski et al., Kraft found that 
humans showed near perfect habitat matching when resources assigned to the habitat were 
shared among all participants choosing that habitat. Additionally, in the condition with the 
best fit to the IFD, a perfect solution, or an exact match of the number of humans to the 
resources, was arithmetically possible. In other words, if the ratio was 5:1, then the number 
of foragers was divisible by 6; e.g. 18 foragers who could distribute in a ratio of 15:3.
When points were distributed probabilistically to a single individual, the sensitivities dropped 
considerably. Surprisingly, no effect was found for experimenter-assigned unequal 
competitive weights. Finally, a condition that utilized movement between rows of chairs 
rather than card choice showed a slope of 0.79. Unlike Baum and Kraft’s (1998) work with 
pigeons, the conformity to the IFD by these human participants could have been driven by 
matching at the individual level. When the distribution approximated the IFD, the group
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slope corresponded to similar slopes for individual choice data. However, because resources 
were shared equally among all foragers present in a habitat, an equally plausible explanation 
is that matching at the individual level was an artifact of the conformance to the IFD in this 
procedure. Other conditions, in which the group did not conform to the IFD, did not yield 
matching at the level of the individual.
Sokolowski and Henaff (1999) presented preliminary data from a study using 
spatially separated habitats and probabilistic assignment of money to one participant when a 
variable time (VT) schedule in that habitat timed out This procedure resulted in extreme 
undermatching to the IFD, with a slope of 0.28. One possible explanation is that because of 
visual separation between the sites, and a prohibition against talking among participants, 
foragers were unable to obtain accurate knowledge of the differences in resources because 
they could not benefit from the sampling o f others in the group. This benefit is one 
explanation proposed for the value of foraging socially. However, it may also be that 
because resources were distributed probabilistically to only one participant, the benefit to 
switching appeared minimal: mostly you get nothing no matter what you do. In other words, 
reinforcement for switching was insufficient to increase or maintain this response. 
Undermatching is the predicted outcome if foragers begin the session indifferent between the 
two sites (distributing in essentially equal numbers to the two sites) and then fail to switch in 
sufficient numbers.
My own preliminary work (using a version of the panhandling procedure described 
below) also showed some tendency for humans to distribute according to the IFD, but with 
low sensitivities (slopes ranging from 0.33 to 0.69). The lowest sensitivities occurred when 
foragers were competing for a single cash prize, and the highest occurred when foragers
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worked cooperatively in pairs. Typically, foragers in the panhandling experiments failed to 
switch between the two habitats, even when they could see (and, in fact, commented upon) 
more money appearing in the other habitat. However, in these pilot studies, the physical 
arrangement o f the habitats made it difficult for new foragers to enter and compete 
successfully, therefore reducing the payoff to newcomers below that of the average for that 
habitat Most likely, failure to switch was due to a lack of reinforcement for switching, 
rather than too high a travel cost because high travel costs have been found to result in 
overmatching in individual choice (Baum, 1982) and in reduced undermatching in the 
distribution o f a group (Baum & Kraft, 1998). In addition, coins were distributed in variable 
amounts, making discrimination between some ratios difficult. Panhandlers could also 
request and receive more than one nickel, resulting in some panhandlers’ receiving many 
more coins than others (unequal competitive weight). Finally, the number of participants 
was high for a relatively small area: 12 to 15 panhandlers per session, creating the potential 
for interference.
These results suggest that humans may distribute according to the IFD in some 
circumstances. However, it remains to be determined what those circumstances are and 
whether the IFD represents a general adaptation among humans choosing among resource 
sites in a group situation. Additionally, the mechanism by which the IFD is achieved remains 
unknown. The model does not specify how this performance occurs, and previous studies 
have not found definitive evidence for viewing the IFD as the accumulation of individual 
forager’s choices.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Methodological Concerns & the Panhandling Situation
Hackenberg (1998) pointed out that tests of a behavioral ecological model always 
involve a tension between laboratory and field studies. The context for the evolution of 
optimal behavior cannot be separated from the behavior itself. However, the laboratory 
provides good opportunity to control variables that can only be estimated or assumed in the 
field. Three factors that drive any model are the decision set (the possible behaviors 
available to the participant); the currency (what resource is being optimized in the habitat 
choice); and constraints (akin to the schedule on which resources become available).
One important assumption o f optimal foraging theory is that net rate of energy 
gain, or some similar currency can stand in for fitness (Cheverton et al., 1985). In the 
1970s and 80s behavioral ecologists noted the overlap between work on foraging and 
operant experiments using food reinforcers. Animals responding for food reinforcers in 
the laboratory are foraging, albeit in a highly constrained environment. Baum (1982) 
pointed out that foraging in the wild must be controlled by its consequences and is 
therefore a type of operant behavior. Lea (1981) suggested that operant psychology may 
provide the mechanisms that underlie behaviors observed in the field and that optimal 
foraging theory would provide the evolutionary rationale for results found in the 
laboratory. Numerous studies have simulated foraging and examined the relationship 
between natural foraging in the wild and foraging in a laboratory situation. Some of 
these experiments have utilized traditional operant procedures, responding on various 
manipulanda on schedules o f  reinforcement, to simulate foraging. Basic aspects of 
foraging, including leaving or travel between patches, search for patches or prey items, 
and handling o f prey items, have been modeled. Laboratory experiments are especially
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well suited to manipulating these variables, and have resulted in findings that typically 
parallel those of field studies (Shettleworth, 1988; Dallery & Baum, 1991).
Yet other work suggests caution in selection of extremely constrained tasks or 
arbitrary responses. For example, Shettleworth and Jordan (1986) found that actually 
handling a prey item and its operant analog, handling time, were not equivalent—rats 
preferred to spend the time husking a seed rather than waiting to receive a husked one. 
Shettleworth (1975) reinforced occurrences of 6 different behaviors with food, but only 
environment-directed, not self-care behaviors, increased. Timberlake and Lucas (1989) 
argued that animals have a preexisting behavioral organization resulting from evolutionary 
adaptations and individual development and that the predisposition to acquire some 
responses and not others results from different reinforcers evoking different systems of 
behavior. Given that the IFD is a model that predicts behavior patterns that arise from 
natural selection, attention to the system of behavior and the ultimate causes of behavior 
cannot be ignored.
The procedures used by Sokolowski et al. (1999) and Kraft (1999) may not be an 
adequate test of the ideal free distribution for a number of reasons. First, both experiments 
used discrete trials. Although participants chose a habitat and then waited for the arrival of 
“prey” items (tokens or points) rather than searching for them, it is unclear whether this 
procedure parallels the continuous input situation to which the IFD is typically applied. 
Concurrent VIVI schedules in a free operant situation would seem more analogous to 
continuous input, in which prey items arrive singly and capture is dependent on choice of 
habitat, the passage of time, and responding.
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Second, both experiments required no particular behavior analogous to search or 
vigilance upon which reinforcers were contingent It seems unlikely that in the evolution of 
human foraging behavior, simply going to a habitat would result in receipt o f food or other 
resources. Hunting, gathering, and scavenging all require additional responses beyond 
simply being in the right place. In the development of experimental procedures, a parallel 
structure between the functional contingencies in the foraging situation and the analog 
operant task is a logical requirement for generalizing between the two. Successful operant 
analogs in the non-human experimental literature are explicit in their attempts to create this 
parallel structure.
Third, choice of habitat was modeled by choice of a card of a particular color. 
However, actual population distribution across habitats requires physical relocation of the 
organism. Because humans are social animals, the social implications of physical relocation 
need to be considered. The behavioral adaptation reflected in habitat choice is unlikely to be 
independent o f the social consequences of that choice. These consequences may be 
reflected in other concurrent contingencies beyond the currency being measured. It is 
possible that social consequences could be conceptualized as a travel cost (which is not 
accounted for by the IFD). Thus, it would seem that a laboratory analogue o f human 
foraging should incorporate physical movement o f members o f the group, but also attempt to 
control the social consequences of movement This sort o f preparation would also be more 
consistent with the original purpose of the model, which was to predict the distribution o f 
organisms in space.
Fourth, foraging in humans may well be a cooperative activity under some 
circumstances. Limiting the decision set to responses for which cooperation is not possible
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or has no payoff may not reflect the environment in which human foraging behavior evolved. 
Therefore, cooperative responses should also be explicitly examined when testing the IFD in 
humans.
Finally, Kraft and Sokolowski et al. explicitly forbade participants to speak during the 
experiment. However, Whitehead and Hope (1991) identified social contact between 
whaling ships as an essential element in establishing knowledge of the resources in the 
different habitats. Even if social interaction is not necessary to meet the knowledge 
assumption, verbal interaction may be a normal component o f the behavioral system 
involved in social foraging and the social contingencies that maintain group membership.
This dissertation presents a series of experiments using a simulated panhandling 
situation to test the IFD. This paradigm addresses the above concerns in several ways.
First, the panhandling situation can be run as a free operant situation. Second, 
panhandling requires the participants to move physically between two "streets" in order to 
change habitats. Switching requires the individuals leave one group and join another, a real 
social consequence that occurs when an individual moves to another habitat Third, 
panhandling requires the individual to make a response once in the habitat, beyond simply 
choosing the habitat This response allows for the manipulation o f several foraging-related 
variables. Fourth, cooperative foraging and verbal interaction can be manipulated to 
examine their effect on the distribution. Finally, an additional advantage is that panhandling, 
if  conceptualized as begging, is an old and common foraging response in humans. 
Additionally, given that humans live in social groups, asking for resources from another 
person, rather than seeking them directly in the environment, may well be an important 
survival mechanism. Therefore it seems a particularly good response to examine because of
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its generality within the species.
This study had four goals. The first goal was to examine whether previous work 
showing that humans conformed to the IFD in a card choice paradigm could be extended to a 
protocol that required physical movement to switch resource sites. Chapter 2 presents two 
experiments that tested whether the IFD described distributions o f human foragers exposed 
to several variations of a panhandling situation. A second goal was to examine whether the 
assumptions of the model as developed with non-human animals were important components 
of the model for human foragers. Chapter 3 presents three experiments in which conformity 
to the assumptions of the IFD was systematically varied. The third aim of this study was to 
assess whether the IFD was more likely to occur when participants foraged cooperatively. 
Chapter 4 presents an experiment in which panhandlers foraged in pairs rather than singly. 
The final goal of this study was to explore the relationship between the behavior of 
individual foragers and the distribution of the group. Chapter 5 presents a series o f analyses 
relating behavioral strategies and individual panhandler performances to group outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2
AN IDEAL FREE DISTRIBUTION OF PANHANDLERS
The first goal of this study was to examine whether previous work showing that 
humans conformed to the IFD in a card choice paradigm could be extended to a situation that 
required physical movement to switch resource sites. Experiments 1 and 2 utilized a 
simulated panhandling situation to examine this question. To assess the internal validity of 
this paradigm, two procedural manipulations were conducted. Experiment 1 tested the effect 
of changing the stability criterion on the measurement of the distribution. Experiment 2 
tested the possibility that verbal contingencies (instructions given by the experimenter) 
governed the distribution rather than optimization relative to the resource ratios.
Experiment 1
'Hie specific aims of Experiment 1 were to demonstrate conformance of a 
distribution of panhandlers to the IFD when the underlying assumptions of the model were 
met and to examine the effects o f two different stability criteria on the resulting measurement 
o f the distribution.
Participants were given the opportunity to participate in a simulated panhandling 
situation in a specially arranged classroom. Five of the participants were assigned to be 
"givers," those who distributed money, and the remainder were assigned to be "panhandlers," 
those who asked for money. The room was divided into two sections or "streets." The 
amount o f money available on the two streets (the ratio of nickels) was systematically varied 
across a series of 5 bouts of panhandling, with a particular ratio in effect for each bout
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Panhandlers kept any money they received, and givers were paid a fixed amount The 
location o f each panhandler was monitored by having the panhandler sign in during any 
switch from one side to another. Preliminary data suggested that the switching would cease 
after a few minutes in each bout. However, to examine this assumption in more detail, one 
group was exposed to 5-min bouts of each ratio, while a second group continued in each bout 
until no switching occurred for 2 min.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of New Hampshire served as participants. A different group of 12 students served 
as givers and panhandlers in each of four experimental sessions. They received partial 
course credit for their participation. Givers were paid $6 each for their participation. The 
panhandlers kept any money they received, on average about $6. In addition, the panhandler 
who collected the most money received a bonus o f $10.
Materials. Givers carried nickels in opaque plastic cups from which they drew coins 
to give panhandlers. Givers wore green aprons over their clothing to make them clearly 
identifiable to panhandlers. Panhandlers carried opaque plastic cups in which they placed 
any nickels they received. The panhandlers also carried small index cards to use in their 
requests to the givers. All panhandler materials were labeled with a participant number for 
identification. Nickels in cups on the north street were marked with a black permanent 
marker to distinguish them from nickels on the south street Data sheets were attached to 
clipboards with watches that were synchronized to within 1 s at the start of the session.
Procedure. Prior to the session, the room was arranged as shown in Figure 1. Two 
streets, “north” and “south” were defined by chairs and had three entrances each for givers.
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Another entrance to the streets at the back of the room was the starting point for panhandlers. 
Clipboards with sign-in sheets were located on either side next to this back entrance. A 
watch and cups with nickels (stacked by condition and hidden behind a cardboard screen) 
were arranged on a table at the head of the two streets.
All sessions were held on Tuesdays at either 1 or 4 p.m. Several undergraduates 
assisted in setting up and running the session. At the start of the session, all participants were 
asked to wait in a hallway outside the classroom. When 12 students had arrived, each 
student drew a token from a cup o f tokens with 7 unmarked and 5 marked tokens. The 
students who picked marked tokens were assigned as givers. The givers then entered the 
classroom to fill out consent forms and receive instructions.1 The other 7 students remained 
in the hallway to fill out consent forms.
The givers were instructed that they were participating in a simulated panhandling 
situation and that they had been assigned the job of giver. They were then told the procedure 
to follow during the session (see below) and asked to put on an apron to identify themselves 
to the panhandlers. They practiced walking through the panhandling area until the 
experimenter was satisfied that they were accurately carrying out the procedure. They waited 
at the front of the classroom until the start of the session. The 7 panhandlers were then 
brought into the room and asked to assemble in the back. Each participant was given a set of 
index cards, two cups, and a recording form. They were given the following instructions: 
This is a simulated panhandling situation. The people with
1 On several occasions, too few participants arrived for the session. Assistants, or 
previous participants (who were otherwise excluded) were allowed to serve as givers. No 
systematic differences were found between these and the other sessions.
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green aprons at the front o f the room will be walking through 
this U-shaped area repeatedly. If you ask them for a  nickel 
and they have one, they will give it to you. You must present 
a card to the giver when you ask for the nickel(l). You may 
keep any nickels you receive. You must be in the U-shaped 
area to ask for nickels. You may go anywhere you like in this 
area [experimenter walks around area to demonstrate], but 
you must sign in on the clipboard on the side you enter, or if 
you switch to the other side (2). Please write your number 
and the time on the watch, including the seconds. You may 
move about freely and change sides whenever you like. You 
may not talk to anyone else during the experiment, except to 
ask for nickels (3). There will be five bouts of panhandling, 
with breaks in between. Between bouts, you will be asked to 
count your nickels and record how many you have received, 
and transfer them to another cup. The person who receives 
the most nickels during the session will receive a $10 bonus.
[Repeat instructions numbered 1-3]. We will start the first 
bout when I say "Go."
The experimenter then went to the table at the front o f the room. When the experimenter 
said "Go" the bout started, and the panhandlers began entering and signing in. Fifteen 
seconds later, the experimenter began handing out cups to each giver. Each giver took the 
cup, which indicated by a number on the inside which of the three entrances to use on that
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side (entrance numbers were assigned equally often, in irregular order), and entered the 
panhandling area. Once in the area, the giver kept walking as much as possible, as 
panhandlers asked for nickels. The giver gave out 1 nickel per person who asked and 
presented a  card, until all the nickels were gone or until they had moved down the entire 
length o f the "street" Givers were instructed specifically not to give more than 1 nickel per 
cup to an individual panhandler. The giver then returned to the front o f the room, walking 
outside the panhandling area, and picked up a cup for the opposite street from the 
experimenter. Thus, each giver appeared equally often on the two streets. Figure 2 shows 
the complete route of the giver across both streets in the panhandling area. Panhandling 
continued until the bout was over. The experimenter's assistants stood at the back o f the 
room behind the clipboards to monitor signing in and talking. They reminded participants as 
needed of these two constraints. Then a two-minute break ensued. During the break, 
panhandlers counted and documented the number o f nickels obtained (separately for marked 
and unmarked) and placed their nickels in a second cup. At the end o f the fifth bout, the 
panhandlers totaled up their earnings. The assistants also monitored these activities. The 
winner’s nickels were counted by the experimenter, and the $10 awarded. Then all 
participants filled out a brief questionnaire regarding what they believed the experiment to be 
about, their level of effort, and what if any strategy they were using. (The questionnaire 
appears in Appendix A.) After all questionnaires were complete, a debriefing form 
describing the purpose o f the experiment was handed out, with a request that participants not 
discuss the experiment with classmates or friends.
Ratios of Nickels. Each group was exposed to 5 ratios of nickels available on the 2 
streets, a different ratio in each bout The north-to-south ratios assigned to the five
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Figure 2. Giver route through panhandling area
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presentations were, in order, 5:2,6:1,2:5,1:6, and 4:3. The same order was used for all 
sessions. These ratios were implemented by maintaining a constant rate of cups entering the 
panhandling area, at 5 per side per minute, with a fixed number of nickels in the cups for 
each side. The numbers of nickels in each cup corresponded to the numbers in the ratios, 
allowing for a "perfect solution" of the distribution of the 7 panhandlers (as identified by 
Kraft, 1999). If the panhandlers distributed according to the ratio and each asked for a 
nickel, they would each receive 1 nickel from each giver who entered the panhandling area.
Stability Criteria Two groups were exposed to each ratio for a fixed period o f  5 min, 
the “5-min criterion” condition. Two other groups were exposed to each ratio until no 
switching had occurred for 2 min, the “2-min criterion” condition. Cessation o f switching 
was chosen as a measure of stability because preliminary data suggested that switching 
would fall off rapidly in the first minutes o f a ratio presentation. It is possible to achieve a 
stable distribution with ongoing switching that consistently adjusts the distribution back to an 
equilibrium. However, this pattern never occurred in preliminary sessions.
Results
Tabulation of Raw Data. Raw data from the sign-in sheets were entered onto an 
Excel spreadsheet, using the sign-in times for entering and switching to count the number of 
panhandlers present on each street at 5-s intervals during each bout o f panhandling. For 
example, if a panhandler signed in at 1 min 16 s on the north and then switched to the south 
at 2 min 17 s, he was counted as present on the north for each 5-second interval between 
these two times. This produced a total of 60 observations for each o f the ratio presentations 
in the 5-min criterion sessions, and varying numbers of observations for the 2-min criterion 
condition (because o f the varying lengths of the bouts.)
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Calculation of the Ratio of Panhandlers. For each o f the 5 bouts in a session, the 
ratios o f the numbers o f panhandlers (north to south) was calculated for each 5-s interval. 
The means o f  these panhandler ratios for the first 2 min and the last 2 min o f each ratio 
presentation were then calculated, using the first 24 and the last 24 observations. (Note 
that, by definition, the mean of the last 24 observations in the 2-min criterion sessions 
was the same as any one o f those observations.)
Calculation of the Ratio of Nickels Obtained. For each o f the 5 bouts in a 
session, the number of nickels obtained was calculated for each minute by subtracting the 
number of nickels remaining in the cups for that side in each minute from the original 
programmed number. For all sessions, these numbers were cross-checked against the 
maximum number o f coins it was possible to give out, given the number o f  panhandlers 
present. The ratios of the numbers of nickels obtained (north to south) was calculated 
for each observation. For each ratio presentation, the means o f these obtained nickel 
ratios in the first 2 min and the last 2 min of the bout were then calculated. For the 2-min 
criterion sessions, means for the last 2 min of the bout actually reflected from 108 s to 
132 s o f panhandling. Because cups were handed out approximately every 12 s, the iast 2 
min o f the bout could only be measured to the nearest 12 s for the 2-min criterion 
sessions.
Fit to the IF D. To determine the fit o f the data to the IFD, two regression analyses 
were performed. The logarithm (base 2) o f the mean of the ratios o f panhandlers during the 
first 2 min of the bout was regressed on the logarithm (base 2) o f the mean o f the ratios of 
nickels obtained during the first 2 min using the method of least squares, according to 
Equation 2. This regression was repeated for the two means from the Iast 2 min of each
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bout. (Base 2 was chosen to facilitate interpretation of the axis scale on the regression plots. 
The integers on the scale relate easily back to ratios. For example, 1 corresponds to 2:1,2 
corresponds to 4:1, and 3 corresponds to 8:1. See individual plots described below.)
Predictions. Perfect conformance to the IFD would result in points along the major 
diagonal, with a slope o f 1 and intercept of zero. It was expected that the regression 
parameters for the conditions utilizing different stability criteria would be similar and close 
to that predicted by the IFD. The predicted directions of any deviations from the IFD were 
undermatching (as found in previous studies) and a bias toward the north street (which was 
the rich side during three o f the five ratios).
2-Min Criterion Condition. This condition was run with one group of 
panhandlers and then replicated with a second group o f panhandlers. Only one bout in 
either session actually lasted longer than 5 minutes. This was the first bout of the first 
session, which lasted 6 min 20 s. Thus, no switches occurred beyond the 5-min mark 
(since the 2-minute criterion meant that there were, by definition, no switches during the 
last 2 minutes of the ratio) in either session.
The regressions for the 2-min criterion condition are shown in Figure 3 (first 
session) and Figure 4 (replication). In the first session, the distribution 
becameincreasingly sensitive to the resource ratios over the 5 min o f the bouts, with the 
slope increasing from 0.45 in the first 2 min to 1.0 in the last 2 min. Minimal bias at the 
start
(-0.16) changed to 0 bias in the Iast 2 min. The resource ratios accounted for the 
distribution at both time intervals, with an r2 o f .96 in the first 2 min and an r2 of 1 for the 
last 2 min. In the replication session, the group also showed increasing sensitivity to the
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Figure 4. Group level analysis for replication o f 2-min criterion condition o f Experiment 1
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resource ratios over the 5 min. In the first 2 min the slope was 0.36, with a bias o f  -0.01 
and an r2 o f .81. In the Iast 2 min, the slope increased to 0.67, the bias increased in 
absolute value to -0.30, and the r2 was similar at .83.
5-Min Criterion Condition. The 5-min criterion condition was also run with one 
group of panhandlers and then replicated in another session with a second group. Little 
switching occurred in the last 2 min o f any ratio in either session. O f the 10 total ratios 
in the two 5-min sessions, 5 would have ended earlier than 5 min had the 2-min criterion 
been applied. In 4 of the 5 conditions in which switching occurred in the Iast 2 min, the 
last switch occurred more than a minute prior to the end o f the ratio.
The ratios of panhandlers and obtained nickels for the first and last 2 min o f  the 
each ratio were calculated and analyzed as described above. These analyses are shown in 
Figure 5 and Figure 6. In the first group (Figure 5), sensitivity improved over the 5 min, 
with a slope o f 0.34 in the first 2 min increasing to 0.70 in the last 2 min. Bias increased 
across time intervals, from -0.25 to -0.42. Variance accounted for also increased, from 
an r2 o f .55 to .94. Thus this distribution was not well predicted by resource ratios in the 
first 2 min. For the replication (Figure 6), the slope also increased over the 5 min, from 
0.24 to 0.97. Bias reversed during this time period, from -0.18 to 0.77. Variance 
accounted for revealed more initial order in the replication session, r2 o f .74 in the first 2 
min and .88 in the last 2 min.
Discussion
The distributions of panhandlers conformed to the IFD in these four sessions at 
sensitivities comparable to those found with non-human animals, with parameters 
ranging from .70 to 1.00.
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Figure 6. Group level analysis for replication o f 5-min criterion condition o f Experiment 1
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One group in each condition performed in perfect conformance to the IFD, or 
nearly so, by the final 2 min o f the bouts. The other group in each condition 
undermatched at levels similar to those found in studies with non-human animals. These 
deviations cannot be readily attributed to violations o f the assumptions. The procedures 
o f Experiment 1 were consistent with the assumptions o f the IFD (optimization, perfect 
knowledge, equal abilities, and decreasing returns with increased density.) The resource 
for which panhandlers foraged, money, is one which humans might reasonably be expected 
to optimize, particularly in the presence of an additional payoff for optimizing (the bonus.) 
The acquisition o f perfect knowledge was facilitated by a constant number of nickels in each 
cup and by a lack of visual barriers between streets, so that both nickels and panhandlers 
could easily be counted. Differences in competitive ability were minimized by allowing each 
panhandler to receive only 1 nickel per cup from each giver that passed by. The one 
assumption not entirely met was decreasing return with increasing numbers: until the 
“street” became over-utilized, all panhandlers received one nickel from each giver, 
regardless of the number of panhandlers present. Because the typical state of the 
distribution was undermatching throughout the session, this assumption was only met on 
the lean side o f the panhandling area. The differences within condition appear to be 
individual differences between the groups, because the same procedures were used in the 
first session and the replication. There are several potential sources for these 
differences. Individual panhandlers within the group may have discounted the delayed 
rewards on the other side differently from individuals in other groups (Green, Fry, & 
Myerson, 1994; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). Individuals within the groups may 
have been following different strategies. Individual panhandlers may have valued
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uncontrolled sources o f reinforcement differently (One example is the value o f standing 
next to a particular person. The value o f a staying near a particular person who was 
moving around the room may have created shifting bias during the experiment.) These 
possibilities will be explored more fully in Chapter 5.
One threat to the internal validity of this experiment was the possibility that, 
despite manipulation of programmed ratios, obtained ratios o f nickels (which were used 
in the analyses) were an artifact o f the distribution of foragers and not controlled by the 
experimenter. In all sessions, the differences in the regression parameters between the 
first 2 min and last 2 min of the bouts showed that the fit o f the distribution to the IFD 
increased with increasing exposure to the resources ratios. Had conformance to the IFD 
been a procedural artifact, data from the first 2 min would have shown as good a fit to the 
IFD as data from the final 2 min. Thus, this possibility appears implausible.
Another threat to internal validity could be inadequate stability in the data at the 
time of measurement. Overall, results from sessions using a 5-min fixed duration could 
not be distinguished from those from sessions using a 2-min “no switch” criterion for 
ending the ratio presentation. No evidence was found that the stability criterion was 
driving the results. Therefore, because o f the similar outcomes for the two criteria, the 5- 
min fixed duration was used for all o f the remaining experiments.
These encouraging results suggest that the four sessions of Experiment lean 
reasonably serve as a standard to which findings from the remaining 5 experiments can 
be compared.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examined the effect o f changing the bonus conditions on panhandlers’ 
acting to optimize foraging efficiency with respect to nickels. The bonus to the top 
panhandler in Experiment 1 provided an explicit rule for maximizing. If  maximizing were 
the result of the instructions regarding how to obtain a bonus and not the result of a tendency 
to optimize foraging efficiency with respect to nickels, then the manipulations o f the bonus 
condition would result in changed sensitivity. If a rule specifies and reinforces an optimal 
performance with respect to seeking nickels, then rule-governed behavior should tend toward 
the optimal performance. If reinforcement for that performance is increased, then behavior 
might become more nearly optimal. In contrast, if a mle specifies and reinforces a non- 
optimal performance with respect to seeking nickels, then rule-governed behavior should 
tend to be non-optimal. Experiment 2 exposed participants to three different bonus 
conditions, the outcomes o f which can be compared to those of Experiment 1. Note that this 
test does not examine whether humans maximize per se, but only whether nickels may serve 
as an appropriate currency. The panhandlers might have maximized the social payoffs for 
conformance to the bonus rule instead of the nickels in Experiment 1.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of New Hampshire served as participants. A different group o f 12 students served 
as givers and panhandlers in each o f four experimental sessions. Students were compensated 
as described for Experiment 1, except that the availability o f bonuses was varied as indicated 
below.
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Procedure. The effect o f the bonus rule was explored by examining three additional 
bonus situations: 1) no bonus—participants received only the money they got in panhandling; 
2) two-bonus—the top panhandler received a $10 bonus and the second received a $5 
bonus); and 3) non-optimal criterion bonus— every panhandler who received at least 75 
nickels received a $2 bonus (75 nickels is considerably less than the 125 nickels each 
panhandler would receive if  the IFD occurred) In all other respects, these sessions were 
conducted in the same manner as the 5-min conditions in Experiment 1.
Results
The data were analyzed in the same way as for Experiment 1. To the extent that the 
experimenter-provided rules governed performance (rather than nickels as a currency), it 
was expected that the no-bonus groups and non-optimal criterion bonus groups would show a 
lower slope, and the two-bonus group a higher slope. Additionally, the bonus conditions 
could encourage the formation of coalitions, whereas no coalitions should form in the no­
bonus condition.
No-bonus condition. The condition was run with one group o f panhandlers and 
then replicated with a second group. For each session the ratios of panhandlers (north to 
south) and nickels obtained for the first two minutes and the last two minutes o f each of 
the five ratio presentations were calculated in the manner described for Experiment 1. 
Results from the sessions are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. Both o f the no-bonus 
sessions were similar to Experiment 1 sessions. In the first session (Figure 7), sensitivity 
rose from 0.27 in the first 2 min to 0.68 in the last 2 min. Bias increased in absolute 
value from -0.25 to -0.51 across the two intervals. Variance accounted for was stable, 
starting at an r2 o f .84 and remaining essentially unchanged at .85. In the replication
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Figure 8. Group level analysis for replication of no-bonus condition o f Experiment 2
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session (Figure 8), sensitivity also improved over the 5 min, starting at 0.50 and 
increasing to 1.07 in the last 2 min. Bias was stable: -0.39 in the first 2 min and -0.40 in 
the last 2 min. This final slope reflects a slight degree o f  overmatching and was the only 
overmatching observed in the study. Orderliness increased as well, with an r2 o f .80 in 
the 2 min and an r2 of .95 in the last 2 min.
Two-Bonus Condition. One session o f the two-bonus condition was run. Ratios 
o f panhandlers and resources obtained were calculated as before. The same regression 
analyses also were performed. The results o f these analyses are shown in Figure 9. The 
two-bonus session also yielded data similar to those of Experiment 1. Sensitivity in the 
first 2 min was 0.48, increasing in the last 2 min to 0.79. Bias dropped from the first to 
the last 2 min, from -0.27 to -0.09. Variance accounted for increased from an r2 o f .74 in 
the first 2 min to an r2 o f .91.
Non-Qptimal Criterion Bonus. One session of the non-optimal bonus condition 
was run. Ratios of panhandlers and resources obtained were calculated as before. The 
same regression analyses were also performed. The results o f these analyses are shown in 
Figure 10. The non-optimal bonus session produced results comparable to the others. 
During the first 2 min sensitivity was 0.35, and this rose to 0.84 in the final 2 min. Bias 
was approximately unchanged over the 5 min, starting at -.07 and ending at -.02.
Variance accounted for increased slightly, from an r2 o f .80 to an r2 o f  .86.
Discussion
None of the results from the various bonus manipulations could be distinguished 
from the results of Experiment 1. All conditions showed the same trends from the first 2 
min to the final 2 min: increasing slopes and variance accounted for. Thus, these
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sessions also showed the resource ratios accounted increasingly well for the distribution 
as exposure to the ratios increased. Slopes were similar to those o f Experiment 1, 
ranging from 0.68 to 1.07, compared to 0.67 to 1 in Experiment 1. If panhandlers were 
following instructions rather than optimizing with respect to the nickels obtained, the no­
bonus and non-optimal criterion bonus conditions might have produced lower slopes, but 
they did not. Additionally, the two-bonus condition might have increased the likelihood 
of following bonus instructions because of the increased expected value, but it did not. 
Therefore, these results indicate that sensitivity to resource ratios was not a function of 
instructions regarding how to obtain a bonus. Because o f this outcome, a $10 bonus 
remained in effect for the top panhandler in each session in all remaining experiments.
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CHAPTER 3
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE IFD RELEVANT TO HUMANS
The second goal o f this study was to examine whether the assumptions of the 
model identified in its development with non-human animals are important components 
in its application to humans. The assumptions o f perfect knowledge, equal competitive 
abilities, and lack o f interference from other foragers were explored with the next three 
experiments.
Experiment 3
One assumption of the IFD model is that foragers have perfect knowledge of the 
resources available in each habitat Abrahams (1986) suggested that undermatching is likely 
to occur when animals have imperfect knowledge of the differences between the resources in 
the two sites. When animals are unable to discriminate between resource profitabilities, they 
choose randomly between habitats. When choice is random, sensitivity to the resource ratios 
necessarily declines.
In Experiment 3, panhandlers asked for nickels on two streets as they did in 
Experiment 1, but variability in the resources made perfect knowledge of the resource ratios 
less likely.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of New Hampshire served as participants. A different group o f 12 students served 
as givers and panhandlers in each o f two experimental sessions. Students were compensated
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as described for Experiment 1.
Procedure. The sessions were run as they were in Experiment 1, except for increased 
variability in the number o f nickels in each giver’s cup. In Experiment 1, every cup on a 
street had the same number of coins for each ratio during the session. In Experiment 3, the 
numbers of coins coming into each street were varied from cup to cup, with two levels of 
variability. Variability was relatively low in one session, SD = 2.13 for the number of coins 
per cup across the session. Variability was higher in another session, SD = 2.73 for the 
number of coins per cup across the session. A list of the numbers of coins used in each ratio 
appears in Appendix B. The mean number of coins per cup for each street in each ratio 
condition was the same as that of Experiment 1 in both sessions.
Results
The same group level analysis was performed for these data as for the others. It was 
expected that, as found by Kraft (1999) and in preliminary data, these slopes would be lower 
than those found in Experiment 1, with less variance accounted for. This effect was 
predicted to be more pronounced for the condition with greater variability.
Low-Variability Condition. The low-variabilily condition was run with one group 
o f panhandlers. The ratios o f panhandlers (north to south) and nickels obtained for the 
first 2 min and the last 2 min o f each o f the 5 ratios o f nickels were as for the other 
experiments. Results are shown in Figure 11. For the low-variability session, the 
distribution o f the groups was not accounted for by the resource ratios during the first 2 min, 
with sensitivity of 0.16 and r2 of .05. The data did become orderly by the last 2 min, with 
a final slope of 0.80 and r2 o f .83. Bias was minimal and stable: 0.05 for the first 2 min 
and 0.03 for the last 2 min.
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High-variabilitv Condition. One session o f the high-variability condition was run.
Ratios o f panhandlers and resources obtained were calculated as before, and the same 
regression analyses were performed. The results appear in Figure 12. The results were 
qualitatively similar to the low variability session above. In the first 2 min the IFD did 
not describe the distribution, with a slope o f 0.19 and r2 o f . 19. By the last 2 min, 
sensitivity had increased somewhat to 0.42, and the variance accounted by the resource 
ratios increased to an r2 o f .90. Bias reversed across the 5 min, with an intercept o f 0.23 
changing to -0.20 for the final 2 min. Given that the data became orderly, this outcome 
could be termed extreme undermatching.
Discussion
When discrimination between the amounts of resources available was made 
difficult by varying the number of coins available in each cup, a number of changes in 
the distribution of the panhandlers was observed. First, performance during the first 2 
min was not accounted for by the resource ratios, suggesting either random responding or 
switching determined by unmeasured variables. In both conditions, sensitivity and order 
increased over the five minutes, suggesting increasing control by the contingencies. In 
the highly variable condition, however, sensitivity continued to be unusually low, 
suggesting that difficulty in discrimination was still occurring.
These results lend limited support to Abrahams’s proposal (1986) that when 
animals are unable to discriminate between the amounts o f resources obtained at each 
site, they distribute and switch randomly until the difference in obtained resources 
becomes discriminable. Presumably, if one site becomes extremely over-utilized (just by 
chance) the differences between sites would become more easily discriminated. Once
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Figure 12. Group level analysis for high-variability condition o f Experiment 3
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discrimination is possible, the resource ratios begin to exert control over the location of 
the animals. The performance o f  the groups in Experiment 3 followed this pattern, with 
a random distribution giving way to a more orderly one. In contrast, in both Experiments 
1 and 2 data were relatively orderly during the first 2 min, even when sensitivity was low.
However, the improvement in sensitivity over the five minutes in the low 
variability group cannot be conclusively tied to increased discriminability because the 
analyses performed do not reveal whether the ratio o f nickels obtained became more 
extreme just prior to the distributions shifting toward the IFD. Additionally, if  increased 
discrimination did cause improvement in the distribution, the question arises as to 
whether longer exposures to the ratios might have permitted the high-variability group to 
more nearly conform to the IFD. However, there were only 10 switches between the 2 
sides for the entire session (see Table 2 in Chapter 5) in this condition. This number was 
the lowest of any experimental condition, suggesting not only that the panhandlers were 
unlikely to have randomly redistributed enough to make the resources discriminable had 
they been given more time, but that resource variability may have suppressed switching.
Experiment 4
A number of researchers have suggested that violation of the assumption of equal 
competitive weights is responsible for much of the undermatching observed in studies o f the 
IFD. In any given population, differences in competitive weight may well be the norm, 
rather than the exception. Variation in competitive weight has been proposed to disrupt the 
distribution in several ways. For example, Houston and McNamara (1988) demonstrated 
statistically that when competitors are unequal, undermatching is likely to occur if better 
competitors force poorer competitors out of the rich habitat and into the lean habitat.
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Competitive weight may also take the form of a more general interference, and this 
possibility is explored in Experiment 5. However, competitive weight may not always 
visibly disrupt the distribution. Groups distributing according to the IFD could still contain 
unequal competitors if the better competitors also distributed ideally across the 2 sites 
(Parker & Sutherland, 1986; Milinski & Parker, 1991). This possibility becomes unlikely if 
the better competitors engage in despotic behavior.
Experiment 4 explored the effect of unequal competitive abilities on the distribution 
of panhandlers. The panhandling procedure was changed to allow differences in competitive 
weights to emerge.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University o f New Hampshire served as participants. A different group of 12 students served 
as givers and panhandlers in each o f four experimental sessions. Students were compensated 
as described for Experiment 1.
Procedure. The sessions were conducted as described in Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. In one manipulation, panhandlers were no longer limited to an equal 
share of the money on each street (i.e. one nickel per cup). Individuals who asked repeatedly 
received more nickels than those who did not ask repeatedly. Multiple coins to one 
individual also resulted in the depletion o f coins in the cup prior to all panhandlers’ having 
the chance to ask, even when the IFD occurred. A second manipulation attempted to make 
competitive weight extreme—all the coins in each cup were given to the first panhandler 
who asked for nickels. It was expected that increased differences in competitive weight 
would result in increased undermatching.
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Results
The data were analyzed in the same manner as for Experiment 1. Data for the first 
condition were expected to show substantially lower slopes than those of Experiment 1.
Data for the condition with extreme competitive weight were expected to show even lower 
slopes and less variability accounted for.
Multiple-request Condition. The multiple-request condition was run with one 
group o f panhandlers and then replicated with a second group. The ratios o f panhandlers 
(north to south) and nickels obtained for the first 2 min and the last 2 min o f each of the 5 
ratios were calculated as for Experiment 1, and the same analyses were done. Results 
from the sessions are shown in Figures 13 and 14. In the first multiple-request session 
(Figure 13), the same trends across the 5-min as in Experiments 1 and 2 were noted: 
sensitivity and variance accounted for increased. The slope rose from 0.44 in the first 2 
min to 0.55 in the last 2 min, and r2 from .79 to .91. However, even in the last 2 min, 
undermatching remained to a high degree. Bias increased in absolute value, from -0.41 
to -0.80 across the 5 min. In the replication o f this condition (Figure 14), the outcomes 
were similar. Sensitivity increased from 0.14 to 0.58, also reflecting a high degree of 
undermatching. Variance accounted for also rose, from an r2 equal to .62 to .91. Bias 
decreased in absolute value across the five min, from -.40 to -.20.
Extreme Competitive Weight Condition. This condition, in which all coins were 
given to the first person who asked, was run with one group and then replicated with a 
second group. The second group consisted of only 5 panhandlers, instead o f 7, because 
o f an unusually high number o f no-shows among the subject pool that day. Thus the 
replication group obtained more nickels per panhandler than other groups because the
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Figure 13. Group level analysis for first multiple-request condition o f Experiment 4
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Figure 14. Group level analysis for replication o f multiple-request condition o f Experiment 4
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cups used during the session had been set up for 7 panhandlers. Ratios o f panhandlers 
and resources obtained were calculated as described for the multiple-request condition. 
The same regression analyses were also performed. These results are shown in Figures 
15 and 16. In the extreme competitive weight sessions (where all coins in a cup were 
given to the first person who asked), the IFD no longer described the distribution of 
foragers. The first session (Figure 15) yielded a sensitivity of 0.22 and r2 o f .89 in the 
first 2 min, however sensitivity and variance accounted for both dropped across the 5 
min, to a sensitivity of 0.07 and r2 o f . 13. In the replication session (Figure 16) sensitivity 
increased from .22 in the first 2 min to .43 in the last 2 min, but r2 decreased from .69 to 
.55. Thus, as panhandlers were exposed to the experimental conditions, their 
distribution was increasingly poorly predicted by the resource ratios.
Competitive Weight Adjustments. Previous research found that adjusting the 
counts of foragers in a distribution to reflect distributions of competitive weight (rather 
than foragers) could improve the fit o f the distribution to the IFD (Baum & Kraft, 1998; 
Grand, 1997; Parker & Sutherland, 1986). In the present study, competitive weight 
reflected the success of each panhandler relative to the other panhandlers in that session 
and was calculated as follows. The total number of nickels obtained by a panhandler 
during the entire session was divided by the average number of nickels obtained by 
panhandlers in that session. Differences in competitive weight between the panhandlers 
did emerge in both conditions. These differences were larger than those of panhandlers 
in the 5-min criterion conditions in Experiment 1, and they were more extreme in the 
extreme competitive weight condition. Table 1 shows all competitive weights and 
standard deviations for these conditions. Total competitive weight was then substituted
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Figure 16. Group level analysis for replication o f extreme competitive weight condition o f
Experiment 4
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for the count o f panhandlers on the 2 streets. If a street was occupied by panhandlers 
who obtained less money than average, the summed competitive weight on that street 
was lower than the number o f actual panhandlers. These revised measures were then 
used to calculate new north-to-south “competitive-weighf ’ ratios. Regressions were 
redone for the last 2 min using these competitive-weight ratios.
For three o f the four conditions, the adjustment did not improve the fit of the 
distribution to the IFD. For the first multiple-request session (Figure 13), the slope was 
0.55 prior to adjustment and 0.52 after. Variance accounted for was .91 prior to 
adjustment and .87 after. The adjustment o f the multiple-request replication data for 
competitive weights (Figure 14) resulted in lower sensitivity (0.32 compared with 0.58) 
and variance accounted for (.77 compared with .91). The extreme competitive weights 
replication (Figure 16) was also not improved by adjustment for competitive weight: 
slope of 0.35 (compared with 0.43) and an unchanged variance accounted for at .55. 
However, the first group in the extreme competitive weights condition (Figure 15), whose 
distribution was not well described by the IFD, showed an improvement in results. 
Sensitivity increased from 0.07 to 0.34, and variance accounted for increased from .13 to 
.87. However, this adjustment failed to bring sensitivity even up to the extreme 
undermatching found with the high-variability condition in Experiment 3. However, the 
adjustment did make the parameters resemble the other sessions o f this experiment. One 
reason for this failure of competitive weight adjustments to improve the fit o f the data 
could be that a given panhandler’s competitive weight may have varied across the five 
ratios. Thus, average competitive weight might not have reflected the success across 
ratios.
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Table 1. Competitive weights used in adjustment o f panhandler ratios in Experiment 4
Competitive Weights
Condition Individual Panhandler Weights SD
5-min critenon 1 08 0.98 1.08 0.87 0.90 1.09 1 00 0.09
5-min criterion rep 1.09 0 98 0.77 1.09 1.05 1.04 0.99 0.11
Multiple request 1 23 0.94 1.01 0.83 0.87 0.81 1 30 0.20
Multiple request rep 0.66 0 80 1 24 1.14 1.20 1.11 0.86 0.22
All coins to first 0.80 0.61 1 32 0.82 0.75 1.37 1.33 0.33
Ail coins to first rep 0.74 0.87 1 53 1.11 0.75 0.33
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Discussion
The results suggest that the IFD may be sensitive to small differences in 
competitive weight. Large differences in competitive weight may result in a distribution 
that is poorly predicted by resource ratios. The failure o f competitive weight adjustments 
suggests that panhandlers were not affected by the differences in competitive weight 
captured by the procedure used to assign weights. Had they been, the adjustments would 
have brought the fits into line with the other experimental conditions.
Weighting according to some other measure o f competitive ability might have been 
more effective. Baum and Kraft (1998) weighted foragers by relative participation (pigeons 
could choose to be in the foraging area or not) and found improved fits to the IFD.
One explanation for the lower sensitivities in the multiple-request condition is 
that variability in the number o f  nickels obtained from each cup (because other foragers 
could request them all before the giver arrived at another panhandler) made the ratios 
less discriminable in this condition than they were in Experiment 1. However, the 
differences in the regression parameters between the first and last 2 min do not follow a 
similar pattern to those of the variability manipulations in Experiment 3. In Experiment 
3, little variance was accounted for during the first 2 min o f the ratios in both the low 
variability condition (.05) and high variability condition (.19). This outcome was 
consistent with an initial period o f random switching resulting from difficulty in 
discriminating the resource ratios. In contrast, variance accounted for by the resource 
ratios in the first 2 min o f the multiple request conditions o f  Experiment 4 (.79 in the first 
session and .62 in the replication) was much higher, similar to Experiment 1.
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In the extreme competitive weight conditions, the difference between the two 
streets may have been less a difference in rate o f resources obtained than a difference in 
amount. Since cups arrived 5 per min on each side and all coins went to one person, 
rates o f arrival o f coins were the same but the size o f the reinforcer was not. Sensitivity 
to differences in reinforcer magnitude may be lower than sensitivity to differences in 
rate, as has been observed in individual matching relations (Rachlin & Baum, 1969; 
Todorov, et al., xxxx).
Experiment 5
Experiment 5 tested the effect of violating the assumption in the model that foragers 
are free to enter any habitat without interference from the presence of other foragers. This 
interference may be independent o f differences in competitive weight and may depend only 
on the density o f foragers in a habitat As density increases, encounters between foragers 
become more frequent. Interference may occur when panhandlers interact, for example 
engaging in social exchanges or spending time moving away from others. Panhandlers 
may fail to ask for nickels while engaged in these activities, temporarily converting them 
to what Moody and Houston (1995) termed “time-wasters.” Baum and Kraft (1998) 
argued that interference may exert its effects through reduced vigilance in the continuous 
input situation. However, interference may be confounded with competitive weight, 
since 1) some o f these interactions will take the form of competitive contests; and 2) 
some foragers may be more effective at avoiding or coping with interaction while 
foraging.
The sensitivity parameter s can also be expressed as 1/m, where m is the amount of 
interference. When m is equal to 1, there is no effect o f interference on sensitivity. If m
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increases above 1 as the density of foragers increases, then sensitivity to the resource ratios 
will decrease as interference from competitors increases (Baum & Kraft, 1998; Tregenza, 
Parker, & Thompson, 1996).
Method
Participants. Forty-five undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of New Hampshire served as participants. Nineteen students participated as 
askers and givers in the first condition of this experiment, and a different group of 26 
students participated in the second condition. Students were compensated as described for 
Experiment 1.
Procedure. This experiment followed the same procedures as Experiment 1, except 
that the number o f foragers was increased. The number o f nickels available was also 
increased to keep available nickels per panhandler constant In one session, 14 panhandlers 
participated and in another session 21 panhandlers participated (compared to 7 in 
Experiment 1). The number of givers and areas of “good locations” were the same as 
Experiment 1. Since space available per forager at good locations was more limited, 
crowding and increased interactions might result in fewer opportunities to ask for nickels and 
less sensitivity to the resource ratios.
Results
The same analyses were performed as for Experiment 1. It was expected that slopes 
in each regression analysis would be lower than in Experiment 1 and that this effect would be 
stronger for the second condition with 21 panhandlers.
14-Panhandler Condition. The 14-panhandler condition was run with one group. 
The ratios o f panhandlers (north to south) and nickels obtained for the first two minutes
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and the last two minutes o f each o f the five ratios were calculated in the manner 
described for Experiment 1. Results from the two analyses are shown in Figure 17. The 
14-panhandler session yielded the same trends as the sessions of Experiment 1, but with 
lower sensitivities, comparable to the outcome o f the multiple-request condition o f 
Experiment 4. Slope increased from 0.29 to 0.35 and r2 increased from .61 to .83 in the 
last 2 min of the ratios. Bias increased in absolute value from 0.01 to -0.11 across the 5 
min.
21 -Panhandler Condition. The 21-panhandler condition was run with one group. 
Ratios o f panhandlers and resources obtained were calculated as for Experiment 1. The 
same regression analyses were also performed and are shown in Figure 18. The 21- 
panhandler session showed a pattern of sensitivity and variance accounted for similar to 
that for the 14-panhandler group. Sensitivity increased from 0.24 in the first 2 min o f  the 
ratios to 0.53 in the last 2. An initial r2 .93 slipped slightly to .89 in the final 2 min. 
Discussion
As predicted, sensitivities were lower than those o f Experiment 1 in both 
conditions. This finding shows that increased density can reduce sensitivity to the 
resource ratios. However, this decrement in sensitivity did not increase with increased 
density, as would be predicted if  sensitivity were inversely related to interference and 
interference increased with density. One explanation is that individual differences 
between panhandlers in the two groups obscured any effect o f very high density. Or, in 
this particular configuration of the foraging situation, the presence o f 14 panhandlers may 
have been sufficient for maximal levels o f interference.
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Figure 17. Group level analysis for 14-panhandler condition of Experiment 5
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Figure 18. Group level analysis for 21-panhandler condition of Experiment 5
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Alternatively, the relationship between density, interference, and sensitivity may 
not be a simple one. Moody and Houston (1995) reported great variation in the shape 
and slope of interference curves taken from various studies. They also proposed a model 
that predicted increased, not decreased, sensitivity as density rises in a patchy 
environment (as opposed to continuous input), noting that the seven studies reported by 
Kennedy and Gray (1993) that did not utilize continuous input showed a mean slope 
greater than 1. However, Baum & Kraft (1998) argued that, behaviorally, interference 
may be just as important at continuous input sites as at patches. They predicted and 
found a relationship between density and sensitivity that suggested interference increased 
with density and produced undermatching.
Although the panhandling procedure was designed as a continuous input 
situation, at times during the session panhandlers may well have experienced something 
more akin to a patchy environment. When too many panhandlers were on the lean side 
and more than one giver was present (as sometimes occurred because the high density of 
panhandlers prevented them from moving quickly through the panhandling area) the lean 
side functionally became a depleting patch with dispersed and decreasing numbers of 
prey items. Thus, interaction between the experimental procedure and increased density 
might have obscured the relationships between density, interference, and sensitivity.
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THE EFFECTS OF COOPERATION ON THE IFD
The third goal o f this study was to test the effect o f cooperation on the 
distribution of panhandlers. Social foraging may alter the mechanism by which the group 
distributes as well as the overall pattern o f the distribution. The final experiment of the 
study addressed this previously unexplored issue.
Experiment 6
The goal of Experiment 6  was to examine the effect of cooperation on the 
distribution of panhandlers. Data from preliminary studies showed that, in high-density 
sessions, requiring panhandlers to forage in pairs increased sensitivity to the resource ratios. 
Experiment 6  assigned panhandlers to work as partners.
In both conditions, nickels were only available to the panhandlers as a pair, assuring 
mutualism. Mutualism occurs when foragers work cooperatively because both obtain more 
resources foraging together than alone (at the time of foraging).
Additionally, in the second condition, fne vaiue of cooperation was increased by 
having panhandlers in the second condition select their own partners. Panhandlers might 
have chosen partners with whom they could work effectively, thus increasing the benefits of 
cooperation to both (mutualism). Secondly, self-selected partners might have been friends or 
acquaintances with whom panhandlers might interact or receive help from in the future. 
Reciprocity occurs when foragers cooperate even if one partner does not benefit 
immediately, but the help (with its increased payoff) is likely to be returned in the future.
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Method
Participants. Seventy-six undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of New Hampshire served as participants. A different group of nineteen students 
served as givers and panhandlers in each of four sessions. Students were compensated as 
described for Experiment 1.
Procedure. Procedures were identical to those o f  Experiment 1, except that the 14 
panhandlers were required to work in pairs. The partners were required to stay together, and 
nickels were distributed to partners as a unit (for a total o f 7 “foraging units.”) To keep the 
number o f nickels per panhandler the same as in Experiment 1, the number of nickels in each 
cup was increased in proportion to the number of foragers, and requests for nickels resulted 
in receiving two nickels (rather than one.) The pair received the same single set o f materials 
as the individual panhandlers in Experiment 1 (one cup for nickels, one set of cards, etc.). 
They were given the following additional instructions at the start of the session:
You and your partner will work together to obtain nickels.
You must stay with your partner, and you may not speak to 
anyone other than your partner, except to ask for nickels.
In one condition, partners were randomly assigned by the experimenter. This was 
accomplished by having the 14 participants (who were waiting in the hallway after 
completing their consent forms) count off twice from 1 to 7 down the line of participants.
The two individuals with the same number were then paired together, so that no adjacent 
participants were paired. In another condition (new groups of participants), participants 
selected their own partners from the others in the group. This was accomplished by asking 
subjects to choose a partner after they had filled out their consent forms and been waiting
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together in the hallway for several minutes. Thus, friends and those who had struck up a 
conversation tended to end up as partners, but not necessarily so.
Results
Based on preliminary data, it was expected that panhandling cooperatively as pairs 
would result in increased sensitivity compared to 14 panhandlers working individually. 
Additionally, it was predicted that the potential for enhanced cooperation among self­
selected partners would further improve sensitivity.
Assiened-Partners Conditions. The assigned-partners condition was run with two 
groups. The ratios of panhandlers (north to south) and nickels obtained for the first two 
minutes and the last two minutes of each o f the 5 ratios were calculated in the manner 
described for Experiment 1. Results from the analyses are shown in Figures 19 and 20. 
The assigned-partners sessions yielded the same trends as the sessions of Experiment 1. 
For the first group (Figure 19), sensitivity increased from 0.39 in the first 2 min o f the 
ratios to 0.76 in the last 2, and r2 increased from .64 to .96. Bias increased in absolute 
value from -0.20 to -0.44 across the 5 min. The replication (Figure 20) was similar: 
sensitivity increasing from 0.21 to 0.73 and variance explained almost unchanged from 
.98 to .94 across the 5 min. Bias increased in absolute value from -0.09 to -0.35 across 
the 5 min o f the ratio.
Self-Selected Partners Conditions. The self-selected partners condition was run 
with two groups. Ratios o f panhandlers and resources obtained were calculated as before. 
The same regression analyses were also performed and are shown in Figures 21 and 22. 
The first session (Figure 21) showed even higher sensitivity and variance accounted for 
than the assigned-partners condition. Sensitivity increased from 0.59 in the first 2 min o f
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Figure 19. Group level analysis for first assigned-partners condition o f Experiment 6
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Figure 20. Group level analysis for replication o f assigned-partners condition
of Experiment 6
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Figure 21. Group level analysis for first self-selected partners condition of Experiment 6
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Figure 22. Group level analysis for replication o f self-selected partners condition o f
Experiment 6
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the ratios to 0.97 in the last 2. An r2 o f .85 increased to .96 in the final 2 min. Bias 
remained approximately unchanged, -0.16 in the first 2  min and -0.19 in the last 2 min. 
Data for the replication session are reported (Figure 22), but it should be noted that 
inconsistencies in independent tabulations o f the number of coins obtained resulted in 
data from one ratio being thrown out, leaving only 4 data points for the regression. This 
outcome should therefore be viewed cautiously. In this replication session, sensitivity 
increased from 0.13 to 0.57 across the 5 min, and r2 from .36 to .89. Bias was almost 
unchanged, -0.15 and -0.16 across the 5 min.
Discussion
The effect o f cooperation was pronounced. In 3 of the 4 sessions, 14 panhandlers 
foraging cooperatively yielded distributions similar to those o f 7 panhandlers and a 
much better fit to the EFD than did 14 panhandlers working individually. The first self­
selected partners session, where presumably mutualism and reciprocity were both high, 
resulted in the best fit, with near perfect conformance to the EFT). The replication of this 
session looked much like the 14-panhandler condition in virtually all parameters. 
However, inconsistencies in measures o f nickels obtained indicated that panhandlers and 
givers might not have adhered to the experimental procedures. It could not be 
determined whether this flaw disrupted the foragers’ abilities to cooperate.
These results show that increased density need not lead to decreased sensitivity 
when foragers cooperate. This finding weakens the plausibility of reduced space in 
which to move or increased difficulty in resource detection as plausible explanations of 
density effects. This outcome supports the notion that density effects are the result of 
interference from forager interaction. It may be that 2 foragers cooperating are
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functionally equivalent to a single forager, forming a “foraging unit.” Consideration of 
the size of the foraging unit may be important in determining whether a distribution fits 
the IFD. Given that many species, including humans, forage cooperatively at times, 
identifying the relevant foraging unit may be necessary in understanding the adaptation 
reflected in a population’s distribution across habitats.
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THE ROLE OF THE BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE DISTRIBUTION
OF THE GROUP
Analysis o f Panhandler Strategy 
The original conception of the IFD did not predict how the performance of 
individual panhandlers would relate to the emergence o f the group distribution. If the 
IFD occurs because each individual is matching, then the IFD need not be viewed as a 
group phenomenon. In all sessions where panhandlers were limited to 1 nickel per cup, 
individual matching by all panhandlers would necessarily result in the IFD. Baum and 
Kraft (1998) and Kraft (1999) suggested, however, that the IFD may be an emergent 
phenomenon that does not simply mirror individual choice distributions.
The distribution o f individual choice behavior need not be homologous to group 
choice in order for the IFD to occur. For example, Maynard Smith (1982) suggested a 
matching-like learning rule to account for the IFD, while implying that individual choice 
distributions could aggregate in a number of ways to produce the IFD. The emergence o f 
a particular performance depended on the initial state o f  the organism. A group of 
deprived animals was predicted to distribute according to the IFD by the a combination 
o f animals who settled down in one site and animals who switched a good deal. 
Conversely, each animal in a group of well-fed animals was predicted to distribute its 
choices in similar proportion to the group IFD. The circumstances under which varying 
performances may emerge in human behavior have not been identified. Kraft (1999) 
found no measure that reliably related individual performance to the group distribution.
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In the present study, patterns o f  individual choice between resource sites took one 
o f two forms. Some panhandlers chose one side at the start of a ratio presentation and 
stayed there. This “strategy” was termed “exclusive preference.” Other panhandlers 
chose a side at the start o f the presentation, but then switched sides one or more times 
during the bout. This strategy was termed “switching.”
Kraft (1999) found switching by virtually all participants when switching required 
only the lifting o f a card and could continue indefinitely without loss o f foraging 
opportunities. Switching was much less frequent in the panhandling situation. Switching 
required leaving a particular cluster of people, moving between the locations, stopping to 
sign in, and finding a spot on the new side. The cost o f switching, therefore, included 
loss o f potential social reinforcers, energetic cost o f movement, and lost opportunity for 
panhandling (no nickels obtained for some period o f time). Additionally, because of the 
time associated with switching and some level o f uncertainty about the benefits (i.e. if 
the ratio ends, or if others switch simultaneously, nothing may be gained), a panhandler 
on the over-utilized side was faced with a choice between a relatively immediate reward, 
and a potentially larger, but more delayed, reward. Thus, panhandlers may have 
discounted the value of nickels on the other side (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991).
For all panhandlers, engaging in behavior that resulted in someone else’s leaving 
the site improved the relative payoff for the person who stayed. Even at the under­
utilized side, a switch out meant that the panhandlers on the other side would receive 
fewer nickels per person. Therefore, cost, delay, and relative payoffs all point to 
exclusive preference as a potentially desirable strategy: the cost o f switching is 
eliminated, for steep discounters the more valued choice is made, and the relative payoff
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will still increase if other panhandlers can be induced to switch (at little cost). If enough 
panhandlers switch, those who remain will do relatively better than those who switch (as 
long as the cost o f switching is greater than zero.) In fact, a difference in payoffs for the 
two strategies did emerge in this study: in 18 o f the 20  sessions the number of nickels 
obtained by individual panhandlers with exclusive preference during a ratio was greater 
than that obtained by panhandlers who switched.
Switching can still be a desirable strategy, however. The panhandler who 
switches out o f the over-utilized side will do better than if that panhandler stayed and 
nobody switched (as long as the travel cost is not too high). Switching did occur in all 
the sessions and followed a characteristic pattern over the five ratios. Table 2 shows the 
total number o f switches per session, the proportion o f switches occurring during the first 
2 min of a ratio, and the correlation between the number o f switches during a ratio and 
the order of the ratio within the session (i.e. first, second, third, fourth, or fifth). First, 
switching was more probable in the first 2 min than at later times in the ratio for nearly 
all o f the experimental conditions. There was a direct relationship (f=.51) between the 
proportion of switches occurring during the first 2  min o f a ratio and the sensitivity 
parameter (slope) for the last 2  min of the ratio, suggesting that when switching continues 
throughout the ratio it is less sensitive to the resource ratios. The consistent negative 
correlation between number o f switches and ratio order suggests that every group of 
panhandlers was becoming more efficient over the course o f the session. Switching was 
a costly and less successful strategy than exclusive preference and declined with 
exposure to the panhandling situation.
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Table 2. Characteristics o f Switching
Condition Total Switches1
Proportion of Switches 
in First 2 Min
Correlation Between Switches 
in Ratio and Ratio Order
Experiment 1
2-min criterion 14 0.86 -0.71
2-min criterion rep 15 0.80 -0.59
5-min criterion 25 0.68 -0.67
5-min criterion rep 29 0.69 -0.78
Experiment 2
two bonus 16 0.75 -0.86
criterion bonus 18 0.72 -0.74
no bonus 20 0.80 -0.85
no bonus rep 36 0.58 -0.82
Experiment 3
low variability 28 0.61 -0.54
high variability 10 0.50 -0.90
Experiment 4
multiple request 16 0.69 -0.74
multiple request rep 43 0.63 -0.69
extreme competitive weight 50 0.44 -0.94
extreme competitive weight rep 11 0.45 -0.87
Experiment 5
14 panhandlers 48 0.51 -0.82
21 panhandlers 46 0.63 -0.89
Experiment 6
asssigned partners 18 0.72 -0.53
asssigned partners rep 34 0.44 -0.72
self-selected partners 32 0.56 -0.95
self-selected partners rep 55 0.69 -0.44
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Given these two strategies, the question can be asked: Is the distribution o f the 
group independent o f strategy, as suggested by Kraft (1999), or is it a function o f either 
strategy alone or the two in combination? To answer this question, the distribution o f 
choices between the two sides as a function of resources obtained must be examined for 
each strategy in comparison to the distribution of the group. A straightforward approach 
to doing so might be first to identify the strategy preference of each panhandler and then 
construct individual matching plots for panhandlers to examine how well ratios of 
obtained nickels predicted the ratio of individual street choice. These plots could then 
be compared to the group plots. If the IFD were a simple aggregate o f individual choices, 
regardless of strategy, than individual matching should reflect sensitivity similar to that 
o f the group data. If the IFD were driven by one or the other strategy, then plots from 
panhandlers using each strategy might correspond to the group outcome.
However, conformance o f each individual’s choices between the two streets to 
the matching law could not be determined when the exclusive preference strategy 
occurred. Exclusive preference yields a trivial matching relationship for a single 
individual’s choices, because all reinforcers are necessarily obtained from the chosen 
side. Additionally, exclusive preference produces zeros in the resource and location 
ratios, preventing the data from being included in a regression analysis. The vast 
majority of panhandlers had 1 or more ratio presentations with exclusive preference, 
yielding too few data points to analyze in an individual plot.
Another way to characterize choice is to pool data, not by individuals, but by 
strategy use during a given bout, separating data that showed exclusive preference and 
from those that showed switching. One might predict that sensitivity to the resource
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ratios would only be observed for the switching strategy. Arguably the exclusive 
preference strategy is incapable o f sensitivity, if one assumes that the distribution o f 
exclusive preference strategists at the start o f the ratio is random and that the choice for 
exclusive preference is made only at the start o f the ratio. However, if the choice to stay 
or to switch is updated repeatedly throughout the ratio, based on the current distribution 
o f panhandlers and nickels obtained, then exclusive preference may be sensitive to 
resource ratios. Some panhandlers switch during the bout, potentially improving the 
payoff for those who choose to stay. Choosing to stay may well take into account the fact 
that somebody else just switched. Thus, exclusive preference may be the result o f a 
series o f choices (in this case consistently choosing to stay) that are sensitive to the 
nickels obtained.
Because individuals who switched during a bout appeared on both sides of the 
panhandling area, individual panhandler resource and location ratios could be calculated 
for those ratio presentations. The switching strategy was analyzed by pooling the 
individual panhandler’s data points from presentations in which they switched. Thus, if  a 
panhandler switched during a presentation, a point on the piot was added that reflected 
the log ratio o f the switching individual’s observed locations (north to south) as a 
function o f  the log ratio of the nickels obtained from the north and south. Data from the 
entire 5 min o f each presentation were used, rather than the just the last 2 min, for two 
reasons. First, nickels obtained by individuals were counted and recorded only after the 
total 5 min, not minute by minute. Additionally, because few switches occurred late in 
the presentation, data from just the last 2  min (used in the initial group analysis) would 
mostly appear as exclusive preference, despite earlier switches. These regression
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analyses were completed separately for all 20 sessions.
Since matching plots could not be created for the exclusive preference strategy at 
the level o f individual choices, the regression analysis conducted for the group as a whole 
was repeated using data only from panhandlers with exclusive preference. Because 
panhandlers with exclusive preference were often distributed across the two streets, the 
difficulties o f a trivial matching relation and zeros in the ratios were minimized. Linear 
regression was conducted to determine whether the log ratio o f the nickels obtained on 
the two streets by panhandlers with exclusive preference predicted the log ratio of the 
number o f panhandlers with exclusive preference present on the two streets. In several 
conditions, this method resulted in fewer than 5 data points because all the panhandlers 
with exclusive preference were on one side, leaving a zero in the ratio. No regression 
analysis was performed if  there were fewer than 4 points. Regression analyses were 
possible for 13 of the 20 sessions. At least one session of every experimental condition 
could be analyzed, except for the criterion-bonus condition of Experiment 2 and the 
assigned-partners condition o f Experiment 6 . As was the case with the analysis of the 
switching strategy, calculations were based on the entire 5 min of the ratio, not just the 
last 2 min.
Using the entire 5 min o f data may reduce the sensitivity o f the distribution 
because it includes panhandlers’ initial choices, which only gradually come under the 
control o f the resource ratios. The consistent improvement of sensitivity from the first 2 
min to the last 2 in almost all group analyses demonstrates this effect. Comparing the 
strategy analyses to the original group analyses may, therefore, be misleading. For 
comparison, the previously analyzed full-group distributions were redone using the entire
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5 min o f  data, not just the first or last 2 min. It was anticipated that these full 5-min 
analyses would show lower sensitivities, but preserve the overall pattern o f differences 
between the experimental sessions.
The parameters from all group and strategy regression analyses are shown in 
Table 3.
Experiment 1
2-Min Criterion Condition. In both sessions, the distribution of the whole group 
over the 5 min showed lower sensitivities than when just the last 2 min was considered. 
The difference between the two sessions was preserved, however, with the replication 
showing a poorer fit to the model than the initial session. Panhandlers using the exclusive 
preference strategy showed lower sensitivities than the group overall, 0.58 for the first 
session and 0.48 in the replication. However, the exclusive preference replication 
sensitivity should be viewed cautiously, as it was based on only 4 data points.
Panhandlers who switched in the first session reflected the performance of the group 
overall (s=0.82 and j£=.99), whereas switching in the replication showed little order or 
sensitivity with respect to resource ratios (s=0.47 and if =27).
5-Min Criterion Condition. In both sessions, the distribution of the whole group 
over the 5 min showed lower sensitivities than when just the last 2 min was considered, 
but also increased variance accounted for. The difference between the two sessions was 
preserved, however, with the replication showing a better fit to the IFD than the initial 
session (s=0.53 and if= 93 versus s=0.61 and if=.9 7 ). This difference was more 
pronounced when looking at the performance o f panhandlers using the exclusive 
preference strategy, with slopes o f 0.49 for the first session and 0.68 in the replication.
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Table 3. Regression Parameters by Strategy
L ast 2 min All 5 min Exclusive P reference Sw itching
Condition s r2 s r2 s r2 s r2
Experiment 1
2-min criterion 1.00 1 00 0.87 0.99 0 58 0 80 0 82 0.99
2-min criterion rep* 0.67 0.83 0.58 0.90 0.48 0.86 0.47 0.27
5-min criterion 0.70 0.89 0.53 0.93 0.49 0.90 0.67 0 82
5-min criterion rep* 0.97 0.88 0.61 0.97 0.68 0.76 0.76 0.93
Experiment 2
two bonus 0.79 0.92 0.65 0.87 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.87
criterion bonus6 0.84 0 86 0.60 0.87 0.91 0.95
no bonus 0.68 0.85 0.45 0.82 0.63 0.77 0.68 0.86
no bonus rep6 1.07 0.95 0.87 0.95 0.61 0.58
Expenment 3
low variability 0.80 0.83 0.69 0.87 0.65 0.96 0.35 0.09
high variability 0.42 0.90 0.35 0.71 0.37 0.55 0.40 0.99
Expenment 4
multiple request 0.55 0.91 0.70 0.83 0.55 0.98 0.33 0.13
multiple request rep6 0.58 0.91 0.38 0.75 0.29 0.15
extreme competitive weight6 0.07 0.13 0 15 0.65 0.27 0.28
extreme competitive weight rep 0.43 0.55 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.18 0.49 0.57
Experiment 5
14 panhandlers 0.35 0.83 0.39 0.69 0.63 0.87 0.47 0.48
21 panhandlers 0.51 0.89 0.44 0.93 0.42 0.83 0.56 0.45
Expenment 6
asssigned partners6 0.76 0.96
asssigned partners rep6 0.73 0.94 0.53 0.95 0.66 0.72
self-selected partners* 0.97 0.96 0.72 0.81 1.11 0.88 0.60 0.68
self-selected partners rep6 0.57 0.89 0.26 0.73 0.42 0.71
"exclusive preference parameters based on 4 data points
bno exclusive preference regression done because  of too few data points
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However, the replication parameters are based on only 4 data points. Switching in both 
sessions showed more sensitivity and less order than the group as a whole over the five 
minutes (s=0.67 and r2 = 82 for the first session; and s= 0.76 and r2 = 93) Thus, unlike 
the 2-min condition, switching in both sessions showed better conformance to the IFD 
than the group overall, while exclusive preference more nearly paralleled the whole 
group.
Experiment 2
Two-Bonus Condition. The distribution o f  the group over the 5 min showed 
lower sensitivity (0.65) and variance accounted for (.87) than when just the last 2 min 
was considered. The sensitivity parameters for both exclusive preference and switching 
were similar (0.67 and 0.69) and reflected the sensitivity o f the group as a whole (0.65). 
The distribution o f exclusive preference was less well predicted by the resource ratios 
(r2= 69) than either the switching strategy alone or the group overall (r2=.87 for both.)
Criterion-Bonus Condition. The distribution o f the group over the 5 min showed 
lower sensitivity (0.60) than when just the last 2  min was considered, but variance 
accounted for was similar (.87) Switching showed a much better fit to the IFD, better 
even than the group performance in the last 2 min, with a slope o f 0.91 and r2 o f .95. No 
regression was performed for exclusive preference because panhandlers with exclusive 
preference were present on both sides for only 3 ratios.
No-Bonus Conditions. In both sessions sensitivity was lower, and variance 
accounted for was about the same, across the 5 min o f  each ratio compared with just the 
last 2 min. The differences between the two sessions were preserved, with the first 
session showing a lower sensitivity (0.45) and variance accounted for (.82) than the
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replication (s=0.87, r2=.95). (Note that the replication group no longer showed 
overmatching.) This difference in sensitivity is reversed when looking at just 
panhandlers who switched. Switching in the first group showed a sensitivity of 0.68 and 
variance accounted for o f .8 6 . In the replication, sensitivity was 0.61 and variance 
accounted for .58. Exclusive preference in the first group showed a similar performance 
to that of switching, with sensitivity o f 0.63 and variance accounted for o f .77. No 
parameters for exclusive preference were obtained from the second group because only 
two data points were available.
Thus, for the first group, the two strategies performed better than the group 
overall over 5 min and about the same as the group overall over the last 2 min.
Experiment 3
Low-Variabilitv Condition. The distribution o f the group over the 5 minutes 
showed lower sensitivity (0.69) than when just the last 2 min was considered, but 
variance accounted for was similar (.87 over the 5 min compared with .83 for the last 2). 
The performance o f the exclusive preference responders was close to that o f the group 
overall, with a slope of 0.65 and rf o f .96. However, the switching was virtually 
independent o f the resource ratios, with sensitivity at 0.35 and variance accounted for at 
.09. In one sense, these data are consistent with the notion that when perceptual limits 
are reached, switching is random. However, the results for exclusive preference do 
suggest some perception o f the resource ratios. Because sensitivity in the final 2 min 
was 0.80 for the group overall, at some point the difference must have been 
discriminated.
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High-Variabilitv Condition. The distribution o f the group over the 5 minutes 
showed lower sensitivity (0.35) and variance accounted for (.71) than when just the last 2 
min was considered. In this session, as was the case in the low-variability condition, 
exclusive preference was also similar to the group overall, but somewhat less orderly 
with respect to the resource ratios, with s=0.37 and r2 = .55. In contrast to the low- 
variability condition, switching was orderly, with r2 at .99. The slope was similar to the 
group overall at 0.40. Thus, in the high-variability condition, switching was relatively 
insensitive to the ratios, but it was not necessarily random, since the resource ratios 
accounted for nearly all the variance in the location ratios. One way this outcome could 
occur is through nonrandom switching that tracks the resource ratios (i.e. switching 
resulting in a better match to the obtained ratios) but that is too infrequent to track them 
very precisely. That is, when the panhandler does switch he switches “correctly,” but 
often when he should switch, he does not. This performance contrasts with a random 
pattern o f switching, in which the panhandler is equally likely to switch “incorrectly”
(i.e., switching resulting in a worse match to the obtained ratios) as “correctly.” Thus, 
the strategy analyses o f the 2 variability conditions provide little evidence for the notion 
that foragers undermatch because they are switching randomly for some period o f  time. 
Experiment 4
Multiple-Request Conditions. In the first session, the distribution of the group 
over the 5 min showed higher sensitivity (0.70) and variance accounted for than when 
just the last 2 min was considered. The second session, like most other conditions, 
yielded lower slope (0.38) and variance accounted for (.75) across 5 min compared to 
just the last 2 min. There was little difference between the sessions when looking at the
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performance of panhandlers using the switching strategy, with slopes o f 0.33 for the first 
session and 0.29 in the replication, with little variance accounted for in either session. 
Thus, switching was not sensitive to obtained resource ratios, suggesting that panhandlers 
who switched either were pushed out of both sides or were unable to discriminate the relative 
payoffs. In the first session, those using exclusive preference showed a slope of 0.55, 
with an r2 equal to .98. Parameters for the replication data could not be obtained because 
there were only 2  data points.
Extreme Competitive Weight Conditions. As was true in the first multiple- 
request condition, sensitivity (0.15) and variance accounted for (.65) in the first extreme 
competitive weight condition were higher when calculated for the full 5 min than for the 
final 2 min alone. The switching strategy showed a slope of 0.27 and rf equal to .28. No 
parameters were obtained for exclusive preference in the first session because there were 
only 2 data points. Given the lack of order at both the level o f the group and strategy, it 
appears that extreme competitive weight disrupted the first group’s ability to distribute 
according to the IFD.
In the replication session, resource ratios did not predict the distribution across 
the 5 min, whereas some order was observed in the final 2 min. Switching showed 
sensitivity comparable to the group during the last 2 min, with sensitivity of 0.49 and if 
of .57. Those with exclusive preference showed a slope o f only 0.20 and if equal to .18. 
Since the variability in competitive weight was the same between the first session and the 
replication, these differences in strategy and group outcomes show that some sensitivity 
to resource ratios can occur even with extreme differences in competitive weight.
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Experiment 5
14-Panhandler Condition. The distribution o f the group over the 5 min showed 
similar sensitivity (0.39 versus 0.35), but lower variance accounted for (.69 versus .83) 
than when just the last 2 min was considered. Sensitivity o f the group overall was poorer 
than either o f the two strategies, with exclusive preference yielding s=0.63 and switching 
yielding s=0.47. Variance accounted for was higher for exclusive preference, at .87, and 
lower for switching, .48.
21 -Panhandler Condition. The distribution o f the group over the 5 min showed 
lower sensitivity (0.44) than when just the last 2 min were considered, but similar 
variance accounted for (.93). The two strategies showed similar sensitivities, with 
switching slightly higher at 0.56 compared to 0.42 for exclusive preference. The 
opposite was true for variance accounted for, with switchers showing .45, compared to 
exclusive preference at .83. These results, along with those for the 14-panhandler 
condition, do not suggest strategy-level differences through which increased density of 
panhandlers disrupted the distribution.
Experiment 6
Assigned-Partners Conditions. The first session could not be analyzed by 
strategy because of a procedural error: some panhandlers did not separately count 
marked and unmarked coins. Thus, accurate individual data were not available for 
discriminating between nickels obtained on the two streets. In the replication session, 
the distribution of the group over the 5 min showed lower sensitivity (0.53), but 
consistent variance accounted for (.95) compared to just the last 2 min. No meaningful 
plot of exclusive preference responding could be made because only 2  ratios had
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exclusive responders at both sites. The switching strategy showed a sensitivity o f 0.66 
and variance accounted for o f .72, an outcome less orderly, but similar in sensitivity, to 
the group overall.
Self-Selected Partners Conditions. In both sessions, the distribution of the group 
over the 5 min showed lower sensitivities and decreased variance accounted for than 
when just the last 2 min was considered. However, the difference between the two 
sessions was preserved, with the replication showing a much lower sensitivity than the 
initial session (s=0.72 and 1^=81 for the first session and s=0.26 and r= .95  for the 
replication). This difference was less pronounced when looking at the performance of 
panhandlers using the switching strategy, with slopes o f  0.60 for the first session and 0.42 
in the replication. With only four data points in the exclusive preference analysis for the 
first session, overmatching was found, s= l. 11 and 1^ = 8 8 . This result was the only 
overmatching that occurred for any strategy. Only two points were available in the 
replication, so no analysis was done.
Discussion
Across the six experiments, order and sensitivity in the distribution o f the group 
typically resembled at least one strategy’s fit to the IFD. However, which strategy was 
similar to the group was not consistent from session to session. Both the sensitivity of 
the exclusive preference strategy and the sensitivity o f the switching predicted sensitivity 
o f the group in the last 2 min (r=.65 for exclusive preference, and r =.67 for switching) 
Plots o f group sensitivity as a function of strategy parameters are shown in Figure 23.
Exclusive preference and switching were not unrelated. Functionally, the 
success o f each strategy did depend, in part, on the other. For example, effective
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switchers had to respond to the relative distribution of panhandlers present, including 
those with exclusive preference, in order to switch effectively. (However, the switching 
strategy could have been effective even if  no exclusive preference panhandlers were 
present.) Effective exclusive preference, on the other hand, depended directly on the 
presence o f the switching strategy to be effective. The fit to the IFD for the two 
strategies could not be entirely independent either. Resources obtained by a panhandler, 
regardless o f strategy, depended on the location of other panhandlers. However, the 
correlation between the 2 sensitivity measures was only .21, suggesting both switching 
and exclusive preference contributed to the sensitivity o f the group.
Perhaps using the full 5 min o f each ratio simply added sufficient noise to the 
data that the actual relationship between the strategies and the group distribution was 
obscured. Ideally, all regressions would incorporate only the last 2 min o f the ratio 
(when the distribution was presumed to have stabilized). However, individual data for 
obtained nickels was only available for the full 5 min.
If the distribution of the group were a function, not o f either strategy alone or 
their sum, but of a single group-level process that combined the two strategies in a non­
additive way, then the group distribution would be an emergent phenomenon. Any 
system may have emergent properties that are identifiable only at the level o f the system 
and not its constituents. An emergent property has been characterized in a number o f 
ways: unpredictability, novelty, causation, and variability (Klee, 1984). Properties o f the 
group or system may not be predictable from the properties o f the constituents that make 
up the system. Relatedly, properties o f the system may be entirely novel properties. 
Emergent properties o f the system may have causal influence on constituents (a sort o f
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downward causation). Finally, emergent properties may be relatively constant even as 
properties o f the system’s constituents change. Therefore, several logical possibilities for 
the relationship between the strategy parameters and the group parameters exist. First, 
order at the level o f  the group could occur with no observed order for the strategies; 
however, order occurred at both levels in every session. Second, the order and sensitivity 
o f the group distribution might typically be better than that of either strategy alone. 
However, when comparing the 5-min group distribution to those o f the strategies, this 
outcome occurred in only 4 sessions o f the 13 for which both strategy regressions were 
available. The remaining 9 sessions varied: sometimes one strategy did better than the 
group as a whole, while the other strategy performed worse; sometimes both strategies 
performed better than the group; and sometimes all three distributions were similar. 
Finally, as these variations might suggest, an emergent group process might result in no 
relationship between the fit o f either strategy and the fit o f the group’s distribution. 
However, as previously mentioned, sensitivities o f each strategy were correlated with the 
sensitivities of the groups.
The strategy regressions reveal that sensitivity o f the group did depend on the 
sensitivity of at least one of the behavioral strategies. Taken together, these data suggest 
that the distribution o f the group may be a direct reflection of strategy performances.
Yet, these data revealed little about the mechanisms behind differences in the 
distributions across the six sets o f experimental manipulations. Generally, the 
experimental manipulations did not appear to exert their effects by systematically 
altering strategy choice, at least at this level o f observation. One exception was that 
strategy performance did appear changed in the competitive weights condition, with a
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tendency for the distribution o f  switchers to be poorly predicted by the obtained resource 
ratios.
Analysis o f the Performance of Individual Panhandlers 
The strategy analysis demonstrated that the distribution o f the group could be 
related to two distinct sorts o f behavior, both of which predicted the final distribution of 
the group. Unanswered questions remain. Do individual panhandler characteristics 
determine the choice of a particular behavioral strategy? Do individual characteristics 
explain the effects of the experimental manipulations or performance differences 
between groups exposed to the same conditions? To investigate these questions, the 
behavior o f each panhandler was measured in several ways.
Description of Indices
Six indices were calculated for each panhandler. In addition, certain 
combinations o f these indices were characterized as particular “types” o f panhandlers.
Success. The first two measures reflected success at the panhandling task: the 
total number of nickels obtained in the session (success) and the relative success of the 
panhandler compared to others in his group (competitive weight). Competitive weight 
for each panhandler was calculated by dividing the total number of nickels obtained by 
that panhandler during the session by the mean number o f nickels earned by all 
panhandlers for that session. (Thus, the mean of competitive weights was always 1.) 
Differences in variability in these competitive weights distinguish between groups in 
which panhandlers were equally likely to be on an over-utilized side from those groups in 
which some panhandlers tended to lose out consistently. Particularly strong or weak 
competitors might use particular strategies.
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Preference Indices. Three preference indices, based on the location o f individual 
panhandlers during the session, were calculated. Two o f the preferences could viewed as 
indicators o f simple rules o f  thumb.
First, the proportion o f the observations during the session (5-s intervals, for a 
total o f 300 observations) in which the panhandler was located on the north side was 
used as an index o f street preference. Values could range from 0 to 1, with zero 
indicating that the panhandler never appeared on the north street, and 1 indicating that 
the panhandler always appeared on the north street. Values below .4 were termed 
preference for the south, while values above .6 were considered preference for the north. 
Values from .4 to .6 were considered to be indifference between the two locations. A 
panhandler with a strong street preference might be following the rule “stick to the 
north/south street.” Such a rule is likely to lead to exclusive preference, since the sides 
are readily identifiable and panhandlers are free to enter either side at the start of the 
ratio presentation.
Second, the proportion of observations during the session when the panhandler 
was located on the rich street was used as index o f preference for the better habitat.
Again, values could range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating that the panhandler never 
appeared on the rich street and 1 indicating that the panhandler always appeared on the 
rich street. However, a value o f .5 is not a genuine point of indifference, because any 
individual preference that matched relative resources would favor the rich street. The 
five resource ratios (5:2, 6:1, 2:5. 1:6 ,4:3) prescribe a total ratio of rich to lean o f 26:9 
over the course of the session. It was predicted that panhandlers who conformed 
perfectly to the IFD but had no special bias in favor o f the rich or lean site, would have a
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preference of 26/(26 +9) or .73. (Since no group obtained exactly the programmed ratios, 
a more precise prediction for each group, based on obtained ratios, could be calculated.) 
Panhandlers with a strong resource preference (for rich or lean) would be a following the 
rule “stick to the rich/lean side.” This rule could produce either exclusive preference or 
switching depending on where the panhandler entered, since the rich or lean side could 
only be identified after entering the panhandling area.
Third, the proportion o f ratio presentations during which the panhandler stayed 
exclusively on one side (i.e. never switched during the ratio) was used as index of 
exclusive preference versus switching. The index could take on values from 0 (the 
panhandler switched during every ratio), to 1 (the panhandler did not switch in any o f the 
five ratios). Because o f the odd number o f ratios, there is no indifference point, and all 
panhandlers were characterized as having a tendency toward exclusive preference or 
towards switching.
Self-Reported Effort. Finally, responses to the post-session questionnaire inquiry 
regarding level of effort are reported. A l-to-7 likert scale was used, with one being “the 
least effort you could make on this task” and seven being “the most effort you could 
make on this task.” The wording o f the question did not differentiate between physical 
effort (i.e. the work o f moving around the room) and effort at obtaining nickels (i.e. 
allocating responses to panhandling rather than other behavior such as daydreaming or 
grooming.)
Panhandler Types
Variation along a single dimension measured by the indices described above 
might be associated with choice for a particular strategy. Or combinations o f several
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dimensions might be required to further differentiate strategies. Individual panhandler 
performance was characterized into types by the pattern o f scores on these indices: 
competitive weight, street preference, resource preference, exclusive preference, and 
effort. (Panhandling partners in Experiment 6 were characterized as a unit.)
Exclusive Preference Types. A panhandler might stay in a given location because 
he or she is responding to the local contingencies involving the rate o f nickels and 
number of panhandlers present. A panhandler with this performance is termed a 
homesteader. The homesteader stays put, and may induce others to leave in order to 
improve his relative payoff. By definition, a homesteader tends to more success (since 
the cost of switching is avoided), exclusive preference, and higher effort. The strategy 
can be used on either street, regardless o f location or richness, so no prediction is made 
for street or resource preference
In contrast, a panhandler might stay in one location as a way o f minimizing all 
costs, devoting as few resources as possible to participation in the experiment. This 
second type is termed a deadbeat. A deadbeat goes to the nearest side and stays there 
throughout, independent o f resource ratios or the behavior of others. By definition, the 
deadbeat tends to exclusive preference, extreme street preference, and low effort. A 
deadbeat should be indifferent between rich and lean resources. Since the deadbeat’s 
success depends solely on what others do, no prediction is made for competitive weight.
Switching Types. Switching based on tracking the payoffs relative to the 
combination o f resources and panhandlers present is likely to be highly sensitive as long 
as discrimination is not difficult. Panhandlers who track are termed trackers. A tracker 
responds to the relative payoffs o f each side by switching to the side with the greater
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payoff. By definition, the tracker tends to be successful, low in exclusive preference, and 
high in effort. This strategy is incompatible with very extreme street preference (but 
could co-occur with moderate street preference) and should track the ratio-predicted 
level of preference for the rich resource (.73).
However, switching may also occur because o f the behavior o f  other panhandlers, 
independent o f the resources present or nickels obtained. Panhandlers may switch 
because other panhandlers induce them to, or just to avoid areas where large numbers of 
panhandlers are present. Switching would occur primarily as the result o f  social 
contingencies and would be insensitive to resources. Panhandlers switching 
predominantly in this fashion are labeled drifters. A drifter responds to the behavior of 
other panhandlers by switching, without regard to the relative payoffs. By definition, a 
drifter tends to be less successful and low in exclusive preference. Since a drifter 
responds primarily to the behavior o f others, there should be no street or resource 
preference. No prediction is made for effort.
Table 4 outlines the criteria for each type. Panhandlers whose scores fell within 
the range for that type on all but one parameter were characterized as that type, if the 
deviant parameter was relatively close to the specified value and did not fall into the 
range o f another type. Panhandlers whose scores fell across two different types were 
characterized as “mixed.” Mixed types comprised 17% of the total number of 
panhandlers.
Experiment 1
Values for individual indices and panhandler types are shown in Table 5.
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Homesteader > 1 any any > 6 > 5
Deadbeat any < .3 or > .7 .4< x < .6 >.6 < 3
Tracker >1 .2 < x < .8 .6 < x < .8 < .4 > 5
Drifter < 1 ,4< x < .6 ,4< x < .6 <.4 any
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Table 5. Individual Measures for Panhandlers in Experiment 1
Experiment 1
Comp.
5-min Success Weight Location Resource Exclusive Effort Type
1 103 1.08 0.31 0.80 0.20 7 tracker
2 93 0.98 0.42 0.19 0.60 7 homesteader
3 103 1.08 0.58 0.72 0.60 4 homesteader
4 83 0.87 0.60 0.80 1.00 5 mixed
5 86 0.90 0.22 0.60 0.40 2 drifter
6 104 1.09 0.25 0.75 0.80 6 homesteader
7 95 1.00 0.46 0.48 0.00 4 drifter
mean 95.29 1.00 0.41 0.62 0.51 5.00
5-min rep
1 105 1.09 0.45 0.81 0.20 5 tracker
2 94 0.98 0.61 0.84 0.40 5 tracker
3 74 0.77 0.70 0.30 0.60 4 deadbeat
4 105 1.09 0.48 0.66 0.60 4 homesteader
5 101 1.05 0.35 0.70 0.40 7 tracker
6 100 1.04 0.32 0.72 0.40 5 tracker
7 95 0.99 0.75 0.36 0.80 1 deadbeat
mean 96.29 1.00 0.52 0.63 0.49 4.43
2-min
1 87 0.94 0.57 0.90 0.20 2 mixed
2 95 1.03 0.46 0.72 0.40 4 tracker
3 98 1.06 0.66 0.58 0.80 3 deadbeat
4 92 1.00 0.43 0.81 1.00 4 homesteader
5 90 0.97 1.00 0.62 1.00 3 deadbeat
6 88 0.95 0.16 0.54 0.80 6 homesteader
7 97 1.05 0.28 0.67 0.80 6 homesteader
mean 93.33 1.00 0.51 0.69 0.71 4.00
2-min rep
1 79 1.06 0.76 0.78 1.00 2 deadbeat
2 72 0.96 0.62 0.46 0.40 3 drifter
3 88 1.18 0.50 0.75 0.20 4 tracker
4 68 0.91 0.85 0.61 0.60 3 deadbeat
5 76 1.02 0.02 0.48 0.80 3 deadbeat
6 71 0.95 0.42 0.62 0.40 5 mixed
7 69 0.92 0.15 0.62 0.80 7 mixed
mean 74.71 1.00 0.47 0.62 0.60 3.86
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2-Min Criterion Condition. Success, number of nickels per panhandler, should 
not be compared across sessions, because the stability criterion resulted in ratios being 
run for different lengths o f time, and stability was achieved more quickly in the 
replication. There were small differences in success within the session, with 
competitive weights ranging from 0.94 to 1.06 in the first session (SD=0.05) and from 
.92 to 1.18 (SD=0.09) in the replication. Street preference varied from one extreme to 
the other within the groups, although the group averages for both sessions showed 
indifference. Preference for the rich resource site was also mixed and generally lower 
than the predicted value o f .73 in both sessions. Given the perfect distribution of the first 
group, the lower than predicted values may be the result o f the preferences early in the 
ratios before the distribution stabilized to the IFD. The tendency to exclusive preference 
was higher among panhandlers in the first session than in the replication, with a mean of 
.71 compared to .60. Five of the 7 panhandlers scored at least .8 in the first session and 
only 2 o f the 7 did so in the replication. These preferences indicate that a perfect 
distribution does not require a larger proportion of switchers. Level of effort among the 
individuals was similar, with a mean of 4 in the first session and 3.86 in the replication.
The values of these indices combined to form different distributions of types 
across the two groups. In the first session, there were 2 deadbeats, 3 homesteaders, 1 
tracker, and 1 mixed type. In the replication, there wasl tracker, 2 mixed types, and 3 
deadbeats. The final panhandler was a drifter.
5-Min Criterion Condition. Panhandlers across the two sessions were equally 
successful, with panhandlers collecting on average 95 nickels in the first session and 96 
nickels in the replication. Within the groups, there was some variability in success.
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Competitive weights ranged from 0.87 to 1.09 in the first session (SD=0.09) and from 
0.77 to 1.09 in the replication (SD=0.11).
Three panhandlers in the first 5-min session showed a preference for the south 
street, and none showed a preference for the north. In the replication two panhandlers 
preferred the south street and two preferred the north. The predicted preference for the 
rich side was found for four panhandlers in both the original session and the replication.
Scores on the exclusive preference index ranged widely in both sessions, with first 
session scores being more extreme. Effort ratings also varied widely within the two 
groups, with a mean o f 5 in the first session and 4.43 in the replication. The types 
observed within the two groups were different. In the first session, 3 homesteaders, 2 
drifters, 1 tracker, and 1 mixed type made up the group. There were no deadbeats. In the 
replication, 1 homesteader, 4 trackers, and 2 deadbeats were observed. There were no 
drifters or mixed types.
Discussion. The individual success values and preferences of the panhandlers 
did not provide any clear source of differences that would account for the range of 
sensitivities across the groups. However, the differences in types between the high 
sensitivity groups (first 2-min and 5-min replication) and the undermatching groups (2- 
min replication and first 5-min) may be worth noting: Drifters appeared in the 
undermatching groups, but not the groups with sensitivity near 1. Other types appeared 
in both.
Experiment 2
Values for individual indices and panhandler types are shown in Table 6. Two- 
Bonus Condition. Success varied among the panhandlers, ranging from 98 to 116 coins
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Table 6. Individual Measures for Panhandlers in Experiment 2
Experiment 2
Comp.
Two bonus Success Weight Location Resource Exclusive Effort Type
1 116 1.06 0.82 0.78 0.80 5 homesteader
2 98 0.89 0.62 0.56 0.80 2 deadbeat
3 112 1.02 1.00 0.60 1.00 6 homesteader
4 103 0.94 0.28 0.68 0.60 4 deadbeat
5 117 1.07 0.15 0.55 0.80 7 homesteader
6 114 1.04 0.13 0.53 0.80 5 homesteader
7 109 0.99 0.40 0.73 0.20 5 tracker
mean 109.86 1.00 0.48 0.63 0.71 4.86
Criterion bonus
1 114 1.09 0.40 0.68 0.40 4 tracker
2 106 1.02 0.95 0.55 0.60 6 homesteader
3 109 1.05 0.54 0.86 0.40 6 tracker
4 119 1.14 0.38 0.78 0.60 4 tracker
5 110 1.05 0.16 0.56 0.80 3 deadbeat
6 87 0.83 0.60 0.20 1.00 5 mixed
7 85 0.82 0.32 0.73 0.80 3 deadbeat
mean 104.29 1.00 0.48 0.62 0.66 4.43
No bonus
1 91 0.88 0.70 0.31 0.60 4 deadbeat
2 117 1.13 0.73 0.73 0.80 5 homesteader
3 93 0.90 0.44 0.53 0.40 5 drifter
4 99 0.96 0.23 0.50 0.40 4 drifter
5 95 0.92 0.30 0.68 0.40 5 mixed
6 112 1.08 0.38 0.78 0.80 6 homesteader
7 118 1.14 0.23 0.59 0.40 6 tracker
mean 103.57 1.00 0.43 0.59 0.54 5.00
No bonus rep
1 72 0.73 0.40 0.61 0.20 6 mixed
2 94 0.95 0.46 0.74 0.20 6 tracker
3 87 0.88 0.46 0.86 0.80 5 mixed
4 107 1.08 0.49 0.87 0.40 3 mixed
5 113 1.14 0.09 0.46 0.40 6 tracker
6 119 1.20 0.56 0.29 0.60 7 homesteader
7 103 1.04 0.24 0.64 0.60 5 homesteader
mean 99.29 1.00 0.39 0.64 0.46 5.43
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obtained. The standard deviation o f competitive weights was 0.06.
Street preference was split, although the mean was near indifference. Preference 
for the rich site was near the predicted value o f  .73 for three panhandlers. There was an 
overall tendency to exclusive preference, with 6 o f the 7 panhandlers scores of at least .6.
Self-reported effort varied widely, from 2 to 7, with a mean of 4.86.
Four homesteaders, 2 deadbeats, and a tracker made up the types in this group.
Criterion-Bonus Condition. Panhandlers collected on average 104 nickels. 
Success varied: competitive weights ranged from 0.82 to 1.14 in the first session 
(SD=0.13).
Two panhandlers showed strong location preference for the north street, with the 
rest near indifference. Three panhandlers showed the predicted preference for the rich 
side, and one showed a higher than predicted preference, at .86. Five of the 7 
panhandlers were predominantly exclusive preference, with scores o f .6 or above. Mean 
self-reported effort for the session was 4.43, ranging from 3 to 6.
The types observed in this group were 1 homesteader, 3 trackers, 2 deadbeats, and 
1 mixed type.
No-Bonus conditions. Panhandlers in the first group on average obtained 104 
nickels and the replication group averaged 99. Success in the replication was, however, 
more variable. Competitive weights ranged from 0.88 to 1.14 (SD=0.08) for the first 
session and from 0.73 to 1.20 (SD=0.16) for the replication.
Mean street preference for the both groups showed a small preference for the 
south side. Individual street preferences were split between the north and south in the 
first group, and 2 preferred the south with the rest near indifference in the replication.
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Preference for the rich site was near the predicted value of .73 for 3 panhandlers 
in the first session and for 1 in the replication. While most o f the remaining panhandlers 
in both sessions showed less than predicted preferences, 2 panhandlers in the replication 
had larger than predicted preference (.87 and .87) for the rich side. This more extreme 
preference is consistent with the overmatching observed in the last 2 min. Individuals in 
both groups were mixed between the strategies o f exclusive preference and switching, 
with no extreme scores in either group. Panhandlers in the two groups reported similar 
levels of effort among the individuals, with a mean o f 5 in the first session and 5.43 in 
the replication.
All of the types appeared in the first group: 2 homesteaders, 1 tracker, 1 
deadbeat, and 2 drifters. The replication group comprised 2 homesteaders, 2 trackers, 
and 3 mixed types.
Discussion. As was true o f Experiment 1, the success and preferences o f the 
individual panhandlers generally did not provide many obvious source of differences that 
would account for the different sensitivities across groups. One exception was the 
presence o f two individuals with an extreme preference for the rich side, consistent with 
the overmatching for the group. (Note, however, that the mean resource preference was 
.64, similar to other conditions.) Additionally, the group with the lowest sensitivity o f 
the four sessions in this experiment, the initial no-bonus group, was also the only group 
to have drifters among its types.
Experiment 3
Values for individual indices and panhandler types are shown in Table 7. Low- 
Variability Condition. Success among individual panhandlers ranged from 70 to 99
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Table 7. Individual Measures for Panhandlers in Experiment 3
Experiment 3
Comp.
Low variability Success Weight Location Resource Exclusive Effort Type
1 87 1.02 0.80 0.40 1.00 5 homesteader
2 93 1.09 0.80 0.59 0.60 4 homesteader
3 99 1.16 0.48 0.65 0.40 7 tracker
4 85 0.99 0.46 0.82 0.40 3 mixed
5 73 0.85 0.38 0.44 0.20 2 drifter
6 70 0.82 0.39 0.67 0.00 4 mixed
7 91 1.07 0.20 0.60 1.00 4 deadbeat
mean 85.43 1.00 0.50 0.59 0.51 4.14
High variability
1 73 0.98 1.00 0.60 1.00 5 homesteader
2 71 0.96 0.75 0.76 0.20 5 tracker
3 85 1.14 0.57 0.96 0.80 5 homesteader
4 75 1.01 0.80 0.40 1.00 7 homesteader
5 82 1.10 0.28 0.46 0.60 5 homesteader
6 64 0.86 0.20 0.20 1.00 5 mixed
7 70 0.94 0.00 0.39 1.00 6 mixed
mean 74.29 1.00 0.51 0.54 0.80 5.43
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nickels obtained, with a mean o f 85. The standard deviation o f competitive weights was 
0 . 12.
Street preference varied from .2 to .8, with the mean at indifference. Three 
panhandlers showed preference for the rich resource near the predicted value o f .73, and 
the rest showed a lower preference. The tendency to exclusive preference ranged widely. 
One panhandler switched in every condition, 2 were exclusive in every condition, and 4 
were mixed. At three extreme scores, this session had the second largest number of 
extremes of all the 7-panhandler sessions. Self-reported effort ranged from 2 to 7, with a 
mean o f 4.14.
The types observed consisted o f 2 homesteaders, 1 tracker, 1 deadbeat, 1 drifter, 
and 2 mixed types.
High-Variabilitv Condition. Success for individuals was lower in this condition 
than all but one of the other experimental conditions (Experiment 5, 21-panhandler 
condition), with a mean of 74 and range from 64 to 85. The standard deviation o f 
competitive weights was 0.10.
Street preference among the panhandlers was split: 3 preferred the north, 3 
preferred the south, and only 1 was indifferent. One panhandler in the session showed the 
predicted preference for the rich habitat, and one panhandler had a higher preference 
than predicted, while the remaining 5 had lower than predicted preferences. Four 
extreme values (all 1.00 or exclusive preference during all 5 ratios), the highest number 
of any experimental condition, occurred in the exclusive preference index.
Self-reported effort ratings were more uniform than in other groups, ranging from 
5 to 7, with a mean o f  5.43 Thus, panhandlers did not appear to perform poorly from a
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lack o f  effort.
Three types were observed: 4 homesteaders, 1 tracker, and 2 mixed types.
Discussion. Values for the individual measures appeared different from the other 
experimental conditions. Both groups had poorer success rates than average for the 
study, but sensitivity in the low variability condition was high. Lower success may 
reflect the initial lack o f order in the distribution during the first 2 min of the ratios, as 
well as the rarity o f utilizing the full complement o f nickels in the cups with the largest 
numbers (which required that all panhandlers be present on that side.)
Note that the low-variability session had a drifter among its panhandlers, but still 
had a sensitivity o f 0.80 in the final 2 min.
In the high-variability session, a large number o f extreme exclusive preference 
scores co-occurred with only 1 panhandler using the switching strategy (a tracker). Since 
sensitivity by panhandlers with exclusive preference depends on the presence of others 
who switch, this preponderance o f exclusive preference might account for the low 
sensitivity during this condition.
Experiment 4
Values for individual indices and panhandler types are shown in Table 8.
Multiple-Request Condition. Success was highly variable among the 
panhandlers, indicating that competitive differences did emerge during the session. 
Nickels obtained ranged from 78 to 125, with a mean o f 96, in the first session and from 
77 to 139 in the second, with a mean o f 116. The standard deviation o f competitive 
weights was 0.20 in the first session and 0.22 in the replication. Street preference varied 
within the groups, although the means for both sessions were near indifference (.41 for
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Table 8. Individual Measures for Panhandlers in Experiment 4
Experiment 4
Comp.
Multiple request Success Weight Location Resource Exclusive Effort Type
1 118 1.23 0.86 0.70 0.60 5 homesteader
2 90 0.94 0.50 0.70 0.60 4 mixed
3 97 1.01 0.80 0.76 0.60 3 deadbeat
4 80 0.83 0.00 0.40 1.00 4 deadbeat
5 83 0.87 0.00 0.40 1.00 6 mixed
6 78 0.81 0.35 0.75 0.80 5 mixed
7 125 1.30 0.39 0.53 0.40 7 tracker
mean 95.86 1.00 0.41 0.61 0.71 4.86
Multiple request rep
1 77 0.66 0.53 0.42 0.20 5 drifter
2 93 0.80 0.58 0.66 0.20 4 mixed
3 144 1.24 0.61 0.88 0.20 6 tracker
4 132 1.14 0.32 0.53 0.20 6 tracker
5 139 1.20 0.29 0.58 0.40 5 tracker
6 129 1.11 0.24 0.64 0.60 3 deadbeat
7 100 0.86 0.67 0.39 0.20 3 drifter
mean 116.29 1.00 0.46 0.59 0.29 4.57
All coins to first
1 99 0.80 0.62 0.55 0.20 6 mixed
2 75 0.61 0.82 0.42 0.60 5 mixed
3 163 1.32 0.55 0.68 0.20 7 tracker
4 101 0.82 0.56 0.43 0.20 5 drifter
5 93 0.75 0.37 0.50 0.20 5 drifter
6 170 1.37 0.29 0.69 0.40 5 tracker
7 165 1.33 0.29 0.50 0.40 7 tracker
mean 123.71 1.00 0.50 0.54 0.31 5.71
All coins to first rep
2 133 0.74 0.25 0.37 0.40 3 drifter
3 158 0.87 0.35 0.43 0.40 4 drifter
4 277 1.53 1.00 0.60 1.00 5 homesteader
5 200 1.11 0.20 0.61 0.60 5 homesteader
6 136 0.75 0.60 1.00 1.00 4 homesteader
mean 180.80 1.00 0.48 0.60 0.68 4.20
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the first and .46 for the replication). Preference for the rich site was near the predicted 
value o f .73 for 4 panhandlers in the first session and for 2 in the replication. All the 
remaining panhandlers showed less than the predicted preference. The balance between 
exclusive preference and switching differed in the two sessions. Exclusive preference 
was higher among panhandlers in the first session than in the replication, with a mean of 
.71 compared to .29. Six of the 7 panhandlers were at .6 or above in the first session, and 
only 1 o f the seven was at .6 or above in the replication. The groups displayed 
comparable levels o f effort, with a mean o f 4.86 in the first session and 4.57 in the 
replication. Panhandlers in the first session were difficult to characterize, with 1 
homesteader, 1 tracker, 2 deadbeats, and 3 mixed types. In the replication, there were 3 
trackers, 1 deadbeat, 2 drifters, and 1 mixed type.
Extreme Competitive Weight Condition. In this condition, panhandlers had the 
highest average success o f all conditions because the procedure o f giving all coins to the 
first panhandler ensured that essentially all programmed reinforcers were delivered. If 
there had been no differences in competitive ability, then all the coins would have gone 
to each panhandler just as often as any other on that side. However, variability in success 
was high, indicating that competitive differences did emerge. Competitive weights 
ranged from 0.61 to 1.37 in the first session and from 0.74 to 1.53 in the replication. The 
standard deviation of competitive weights was 0.33 for both sessions.
Mean street preferences were at or near indifference for both sessions. However, 
scores in the replication tended to be more extreme. Although both sessions also 
showed typical mean values for resource preference, one value in the replication was 
extreme at 1.00. Switching was the predominant strategy in the first session, with a mean
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exclusive preference o f  .31, and the opposite was true of the replication, with a mean of 
.68. Note that 2 o f the 5 panhandlers in the replication were exclusive for all five ratios. 
Average effort ratings were higher in the first group (5.71) than in the replication group 
(4.20), and both had only a 2-point range.
Relatively few types were observed in each o f the groups. In the first group, there 
were no homesteaders or deadbeats. Three trackers, 2 drifters, and 2 mixed types were 
observed. The replication group also had 2 drifters, combined with 3 homesteaders.
Discussion. Although regression parameters for the two multiple-request groups 
were virtually identical, the descriptions of individual performance were more disparate. 
Competitive weights were similar, but strategies chosen by the panhandlers were 
dissimilar across the sessions. The first group had a high level of exclusive preference: 
only one panhandler was using a switching strategy. The replication group was 
dominated by switching and had 2 drifters present in the group. Thus, it appears that 
similar, extreme undermatching occurred differently in these 2 groups exposed to the 
same experimental conditions.
Index values for panhandlers in the extreme competitive weight conditions did 
not reveal clear parallels to the performance o f the other groups. The initial session 
resulted in a distribution that was not predicted by the resource ratios. However, the only 
noticeable difference at the level of the individual was the high level o f  switching and the 
lack o f both homesteaders and deadbeats. It should be noted that a similar pattern among 
individuals was found in the assigned-partners replication group in Experiment 6 (see 
below), which undermatched but was orderly with respect to the resource ratios. 
Performance was slightly better in the replication, but the strategy preference was less
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flexible because 2 panhandlers showed strict exclusive preference, one for the north 
street and one for the rich. The exclusive strategy regression parameters, in fact, show 
virtually no order or sensitivity for this strategy in the replication. Two drifters appeared 
in each o f these two low sensitivity sessions.
The observed differences in strategy and individual performance did not clarify how 
competitive weight exerted its effect The notion that better competitors dominated the rich 
side was not supported: individual resource preferences were not extreme in this 
experiment—all but one panhandler spent substantial time on both the lean and rich sides. 
Experiment 5
Values for individual indices and panhandler types are shown in Table 9.
14-Panhandler Condition. Panhandlers in this condition experienced a low 
success rate compared to other experimental conditions in the study. Nickels obtained 
ranged from 60 to 101, with a mean of 83. However, this difference may be due to the 
constant number of givers across experiments, with increased numbers o f nickels per cup 
to keep reinforcement rates constant. This procedure resulted in each giver taking 5-10 s 
longer to complete a pass through the panhandling area. Many cups with coins remained 
untouched at the end of the session. Thus, differences in the success o f these 
panhandlers may not be the result o f any difference in their behavior compared to other 
groups. Nonetheless, differences in competitive weight emerged: the standard deviation 
o f competitive weights, at 0.15, was higher than in any but the competitive weights 
conditions and the no-bonus replication condition.
Street preference varied widely, from .09 to .92, although the mean showed 
indifference (.48). Preference for the rich site was near the predicted value o f .73 for
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Table 9. Individual Measures for Panhandlers in Experiment 5
Experiment 5
Comp.
14 panhandlers Success Weight Location Resource Exclusive Effort Type
1 92 1.11 0.55 0.40 0.00 5 tracker
2 92 1.11 0.92 0.52 0.60 5 homesteader
3 86 1.04 0.65 0.96 0.60 4 homesteader
4 57 0.69 0.85 0.45 0.60 4 deadbeat
5 86 1.04 0.61 0.75 0.60 4 homesteader
6 75 0.90 0.44 0.47 0.00 5 drifter
7 87 1.05 0.40 0.81 0.60 5 homesteader
8 60 0.72 0.18 0.44 0.20 4 drifter
9 89 1.07 0.09 0.50 0.80 6 homesteader
10 82 0.99 0.15 0.55 0.80
11 86 1.04 0.32 0.32 0.80 6 homesteader
12 101 1.22 0.52 0.52 0.00 7 tracker
13 78 0.94 0.58 0.85 0.60 6 mixed
14 91 1.10 0.39 0.63 0.00
mean 83.00 1.00 0.48 0.58 0.44 5.08
21 panhandlers
1 58 0.83 0.42 0.56 0.40 3 drifter
2 53 0.76 0.89 0.63 0.60 3 deadbeat
3 60 0.86 0.56 0.77 0.40 4 mixed
4 70 1.00 0.26 0.53 0.40 1 mixed
5 82 1.17 0.50 0.76 0.20 6 tracker
6 71 1.02 0.59 0.79 0.20 3 mixed
7 70 1.00 0.44 0.43 0.80 4 homesteader
8 79 1.13 0.84 0.75 0.80 5 homesteader
9 68 0.97 0.54 0.56 0.00 4 drifter
10 77 1.10 0.87 0.46 0.60 5 homesteader
11 77 1.10 0.60 0.82 0.40 4 tracker
12 66 0.94 0.54 0.71 0.20 4 mixed
13 57 0.82 0.20 0.21 1.00 3 deadbeat
14 79 1.13 0.06 0.45 0.80 5 homesteader
15 55 0.79 0.89 0.49 0.80 4 deadbeat
16 83 1.19 0.21 0.60 0.60 3 mixed
17 73 1.04 0.09 0.49 0.80 4 deadbeat
18 52 0.74 0.00 0.40 1.00 2 deadbeat
19 77 1.10 0.36 0.74 0.20 6 tracker
20 75 1.07 0.30 0.62 0.40 5 tracker
21 86 1.23 0.20 0.60 0.60 5 homesteader
mean 69.90 1.00 0.45 0.59 0.53 3.95
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only 2 o f the 14 panhandlers in the session. Two panhandlers showed more preference 
for the rich side (.96 and .85) and ten showed less. The tendency to exclusive preference 
averaged .44. Four panhandlers switched during every ratio, the highest proportion of 
any experimental condition. Self-reported effort ranged from 4 to 7, with a mean o f 5.08. 
Two values were missing because o f panhandlers who left before completing the post­
session questionnaire. Two panhandlers could not be characterized for type because o f 
the missing values for effort. All types were observed in the remaining 12 panhandlers:
6 homesteaders, 2 trackers, 1 deadbeat, 2 drifters, and a mixed type.
21-Panhandler Condition. Panhandlers in the high interference condition were 
the least successful group in any experimental condition, with a mean number o f nickels 
obtained of 70. Increased time needed for givers to pass out nickels was even more 
marked than in the 14-panhandler condition (see above). Similar to the 14-panhandler 
condition, competitive weights were highly variable, from .74 to 1.23, with a standard 
deviation of 0.15.
Street preference was variable with a mean near indifference. Seven o f the 21 
panhandlers showed the predicted preference based on relative richness, with preferences 
in the .7 to .8 range, while the rest showed lower than predicted preferences. Overall, 
exclusive preference scores were similar to other conditions, although there were 
relatively fewer extreme scores. Self-reported effort ratings had a mean 3.95, lower than 
all but one other experimental condition in the study. Scores ranged from 1 to 6, with no 
missing values.
All types were represented among the 21 panhandlers. There were 5 
homesteaders, 5 deadbeats, 4 trackers, 2 drifters, and 5 mixed types.
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Discussion. The two groups’ overall distributions were not explained by 
differences in the individual indices. The 21-panhandler group reported less effort, but 
was more sensitive to the IFD. While the effect o f interference would be expected to be 
more pronounced in the 21-person group, no strong pattern emerged that would suggest 
that these panhandlers’ strategies were sensitive to the increased interference. They did 
not develop any increased tendency toward exclusive preference or switching.
One mechanism by which interference may exert effect is by allowing 
competitive differences to emerge, with some panhandlers perhaps better able to respond 
efficiently in the presence of increased numbers of panhandlers. (For example, some 
panhandlers may move in front o f others, blocking the opportunity for those in back to 
obtain nickels.) Beyond the competitive weight measure, however, none o f the 
individual indices would be sensitive to the presence o f these more efficient responses. 
Thus, a competitive weights explanation seems plausible, but not definitive.
Experiment 6
Values for individual indices and panhandler types are shown in Table 10.
Assigned Partners Conditions. In the first session, average success for each pair 
o f panhandling partners was 194, or 97 nickels per person. In the replication, this was a 
bit lower, at 181 nickels. The standard deviation o f competitive weights was 0.10 for 
both sessions.
Mean street preferences were similar across the two sessions (.44 for the first and 
.46 for the replication), although scores in the first session were more varied.
Preference for the rich site was near the predicted value o f .73 for 4 panhandling 
pairs in the first session and 2 in the replication. Most of the remaining pairs showed
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Table 10. Individual Measures for Panhandlers in Experiment 6
Experiment 6
Comp.
Assigned partners Success Weight Location Resource Exclusive Effort Type
1 190 0.98 0.45 0.76 0.20 4 tracker
2 226 1.17 0.77 0.82 0.80 6 homesteader
3 169 0.87 0.65 0.65 0.60 5 mixed
4 209 1.08 0.74 0.70 0.60 5 homesteader
5 173 0.89 0.42 0.63 0.40 4 drifter
6 192 0.99 0.05 0.45 0.80 4 deadbeat
7 196 1.01 0.02 0.38 0.80 6 homesteader
mean 193.57 1.00 0.44 0.63 0.60 4.64
Assigned partners rep
1 156 0.86 0.32 0.41 0.20 6 drifter
2 199 1.10 0.63 0.74 0.20 6 tracker
3 163 0.90 0.62 0.87 0.60 5 mixed
4 197 1.09 0.35 0.51 0.40 5 tracker
5 186 1.03 0.39 0.58 0.40 7 tracker
6 199 1.10 0.48 0.82 0.20 6 tracker
7 167 0.92 0.42 0.46 0.40 5 drifter
mean 181.00 1.00 0.46 0.63 0.34 5.57
Self-selected partners
1 218 1.06 0.86 0.46 0.60 5 homesteader
2 187 0.91 0.43 0.78 0.40 5 mixed
3 207 1.00 0.54 0.87 0.20 5 tracker
4 206 1.00 0.67 0.90 0.20 7 tracker
5 182 0.88 0.27 0.27 0.80 3 deadbeat
6 224 1.08 0.20 0.60 1.00 7 homesteader
7 222 1.07 0.26 0.66 0.60 6 homesteader
mean 206.57 1.00 0.46 0.65 0.54 5.29
Self-selected partners rep
1 172 1.08 0.70 0.61 0.2 4 tracker
2 134 0.84 0.43 0.49 0 6 drifter
3 159 1.00 0.78 0.38 0.6 5 homesteader
4 113 0.71 0.38 0.30 0.6 2 deadbeat
5 214 1.34 0.55 0.76 0.4 6 tracker
6 150 0.94 0.00 0.41 1 3 deadbeat
7 174 1.09 0.09 0.47 0.6 7 homesteader
mean 159.43 1.00 0.42 0.49 0.49 4.57
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less than the predicted preference, but one in the replication showed a higher preference.
The tendency to exclusive preference was substantially higher among panhandlers in the 
first session than in the replication. Five o f the seven pairs were at .6 or higher in the 
first session and only one pair o f  the seven was at .6 or higher in the replication. Self- 
reported levels of effort in the first session were somewhat lower than the replication, 
4.64 compared to 5.57. Effort scores were less variable than in other experimental 
conditions, with a range of 2 in each group.
All panhandler types were observed in the first session, with 3 homesteaders, I 
deadbeat, 1 tracker, 1 drifter, and 1 mixed type. No homesteaders or deadbeats were 
present in the replication group; rather, 4 trackers, 2 drifters, and 1 mixed type were 
observed.
Self-Selected Partners Conditions. Panhandlers across the two sessions were not 
equally successful, with panhandling pairs in the first session collecting on average 207 
nickels compared to 159 nickels in the replication. Within the groups, there was also 
variability in success. Competitive weights ranged from 0.88 to 1.08 in the first session 
(SD=0.08) and from 0.71 to 1.34 in the replication (SD=0.20). Street preference varied 
widely in both groups.
One pair in the first session and 1 in the replication showed the predicted 
preference based on the relative richness o f the streets, with preferences in the .7 to .8 
range. However, 2 panhandlers in the first session showed considerably higher 
preference than predicted for the rich side, with values o f .87 and .90. Scores on the 
exclusive preference index ranged widely in both sessions, with both means near 
indifference. Effort ratings also varied widely within the two groups, with a mean o f
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5.29 in the first session and 4.51 in the replication.
Discussion. The success and preferences of the assigned-partners pairs again 
showed that aggregates o f different individual performances could result in similarly 
sensitive and orderly distributions. These sessions differed in degree of exclusive 
preference, self-reported effort, and presence of panhandlers types. Conversely, the self­
selected partners conditions showed that groups that were relatively similar in the pattern 
o f individual indices may yield different distributions. The one individual measure that 
tracked group sensitivity was variability in competitive weight. Additionally, in the 
session with highest sensitivity, the first self-selected partners condition, no drifters were 
observed.
Relationships Among the Individual Measures and Sensitivity Parameters
Individual Indices. Plots o f sensitivity in the last 2 min as a function o f the group 
means for each index are shown in Figure 24. Two moderate relationships were found: 
an inverse relationship between standard deviation o f competitive weight and sensitivity 
(r=-.47), and a direct relationship between resource preference and sensitivity (r=.72).
The association with variable competitive weight lends support to the idea that 
undermatching is the result of differences in competitive weight. The association with 
preference for the rich resource is a mathematical necessity. First, preference between 
the resource sites when the group conforms to the IFD should be about .73. As the group 
tends toward undermatching, by definition too many panhandlers are at the lean site (the 
opposite would true o f overmatching). Therefore, mean resource preference should be 
directly related to sensitivity, as was found.
Panhandler Types. Plots o f sensitivity in the last 2 min as a function o f the
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presence o f the various types are shown in Figure 25. There were no correlations 
between the presence o f homesteaders, deadbeats, or trackers and sensitivity, nor 
between the overall proportion o f active strategists (homesteaders and trackers) and 
sensitivity. Thus, at the level o f the individual, the exclusive preference and switching 
strategies were not necessarily tied to sensitivity, as they were at the level of the strategy. 
There was, however, a negative correlation between the number o f drifters in the group 
and group sensitivity in the last 2 min (r=-.52). This relationship, considered together 
with the correlation between sensitivity of the switching strategy and group sensitivity, 
suggests that random (with respect to the relative payoffs) switching is one reason for 
undermatching. Unfortunately, interpreting the validity o f  the “drifter” as functional 
reality is complex. On the one hand, by definition the drifter incorporates the factors 
identified as important to sensitivity: low competitive weight, lower than predicted 
preference for the rich side. The deleterious effects o f a random switcher are also easy 
to predict: 1) sensitivity of exclusive preference would necessarily drop if only drifters 
were switching; and 2) switchers would have increased costs associated with their 
performance, because more switches are likely to be necessary to track the higher payoff. 
This cost could reduce switching and, consequently, sensitivity. On the other hand, the 
standard deviation of competitive weight and the number o f drifters in the group were 
correlated (r=.54). The drifter construct may simply tap the differences in competitive 
weighting between groups. Further analyses o f the raw data are needed to determine 
whether drifter behavior is distinct from other sorts o f  low competitive weight or other 
switching performances (e.g. do drifters tend to switch away from a more ideal 
distribution while others switch toward it?) It should also be noted that the causal
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direction o f relations between strategy and individual behavioral measures cannot be 
determined in this study. It is possible that the group in the situation induced drifter 
behavior, rather than the drifter altering the group. Also, since a new group participated 
in each session, there were no repeated measures that would allow evaluation o f the 
stability o f any o f these individual measures or characterizations.
Discussion o f Strategies and Individual Analyses 
Two distinct types of behavior occurred among the panhandlers, exclusive 
preference and switching. Although both strategies were successful, exclusive preference 
tended to be more so. The distribution o f the group appeared to require sensitivity of at 
least one o f these strategies. However, no strong evidence was found for the primacy o f 
one strategy over the other or for the particular combination o f  strategies needed to 
produce the IFD. Experimental manipulations did not appear to affect choice o f strategy, 
except in Experiment 4. Sensitivity o f the switching strategy did appear to be 
differentially affected in the competitive-weight manipulations, suggesting that specific 
tests o f the effects of competitive weight on switching behavior in future work might be 
fruitful.
Measures of individual panhandler performance tended to rule out the idea that 
differences in sensitivity occurred because o f simple individual differences, such as 
increased levels o f street preference in insensitive groups. Most measures varied in all 
sessions, regardless o f experimental manipulation, and there were few relationships 
between the measures and group sensitivity. Across all experimental conditions, higher 
variation in competitive weight within a group was inversely related to sensitivity, but 
with no evidence that this was the result o f better competitors dominating the rich side.
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Only drifters were associated with sensitivity, but a distinct causal relationship was not 
established.




This series of experiments revealed three novel findings. First, previous work 
showing that humans conformed to the IFD in a card choice paradigm was extended to a 
situation that required physical movement to switch resource sites. Second, violations o f 
the assumptions of the IFD disrupted the distribution as predicted by work with non-human 
animals. Third, cooperative foraging improved the conformance of foragers to the IFD 
compared to the same number of foragers working individually.
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that the IFD can be applied to groups of 
humans foraging in spatially separated habitats when the assumptions of the model are 
met. The distribution of a group was examined in a simulated panhandling situation, where 
foragers could obtain nickels by asking for them on two streets with varying ratios of 
resources. The observed sensitivities of the distribution of panhandlers in Experiments 1 
and 2 ranged from .7 to 1, comparable to findings with non-human animals (Kennedy & 
Gray, 1993). The source of the variability in sensitivity between groups in these two 
experiments was not identified, as differences were not systematic across experimental 
conditions. The use of spatially separated locations, continuous input schedules, and 
ecologically valid responses and contingencies addressed potential limits on the generality of 
previous findings with human subjects (Kraft, 1999; Sokolowski, et al, 1999.) The two 
experiments also explored procedural factors that could be seen as threatening the validity of 
the results in the panhandling situation (Hackenberg, 1998). The problem of stability, when 
to measure the distribution, was examined in Experiment 1. The distribution stabilized
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
rapidly, regardless of whether ratio bouts were limited to 5 min or allowed to continue until 
no switching occurred for 2 min, indicating that brief exposure to the ratios was sufficient to 
produce the IFD. Experiment 2 examined the relative importance of two currencies in the 
panhandling situation: reinforcement for following an experimenter-provided rule regarding 
how to obtain a bonus versus nickels obtained. Good fits to the IFD across all bonus 
conditions showed that nickels, not the rule, controlled the distribution.
Experiments 3, 4, and 5 varied the degree to which each of the underlying 
assumptions o f the IFD was met in the panhandling situation. When optimality models 
fail to predict behavior accurately, violation o f one or more o f the assumptions (whether 
previously identified or not) is assumed to be the cause, because the predictions follow 
directly from the assumptions (Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990.) The assumptions o f 
perfect knowledge (Abrahams, 1986), equal competitive weight (Houston & McNamara, 
1988; Milinski & Parker, 1991), and lack of interference from other competitors 
(Tregenza, 1994; Baum & FCraft, 1998) have all been proposed to explain deviations 
from the IFD. As predicted by findings with non-human animals, violations o f the 
assumptions disrupted the IFD in the panhandling situation.
Experiment 3 violated the assumption of perfect knowledge by making it more 
difficult for panhandlers to discriminate between the amounts o f money available on the two 
streets. In Experiment 1, every cup on a street had the same number of coins for each ratio 
condition during the session. In Experiment 3, the numbers o f coins coming into each street 
were varied from cup to cup, with two levels o f variability. The resulting distribution o f the 
panhandlers was distinct from that o f the panhandlers in Experiment 1. Performance 
during the initial 2 min of each session was not predicted by the resource ratios,
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suggesting random switching. In both conditions, sensitivity and order emerged by the 
end o f the five minutes, demonstrating increasing control by the contingencies. In the 
higher variability condition sensitivity continued to be quite low, suggesting that 
difficulty in discrimination was still occurring. These results provide some support for 
Abrahams’ proposal (1986) that when animals are unable to discriminate between the 
amounts of resources obtained at each site, they distribute and switch randomly. 
Presumably, if one site becomes extremely over-utilized (just by chance) the differences 
between the two sites would become discriminable. Once discrimination is possible, 
then the resource ratios exert control over the location o f the animals. The performance 
o f the groups in Experiment 3 followed this pattern in a general way, with a random 
distribution giving way to one more predicted by the resource ratios. (By contrast, in 
Experiments 1 and 2 the resource ratios accounted for much of the variance in the 
distributions o f panhandlers by the end of the first 2 min, even though sensitivity during 
these first two minutes was low.) However, whether the mechanism for this effect was as 
Abrahams hypothesized was not clear.
Experiment 4 addressed the assumption o f equal competitive weights. Violation 
o f this assumption turned out to be the most disruptive manipulation, reducing 
sensitivity in all sessions and resulting in a failure o f the IFD to describe the distribution 
in one session. In the first condition, panhandlers were no longer limited to an equal share of 
the money on each street (i.e. one nickel per cup). Individuals who asked repeatedly received 
more nickels than those who did not, and differences in overall success in obtaining nickels 
emerged in the session. The distributions for both sessions were orderly with respect to the 
resource ratios, but undermatching was pronounced.
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A second manipulation attempted to make competitive weight extreme—all the 
coins in each cup were given to the first panhandler who asked for nickels. Thus, 
panhandlers who tended to move in front o f others and ask quickly received nickels more 
often than those who tended to stand back. This procedure produced the most pronounced 
differences in success between panhandlers. The obtained resource ratios did not predict the 
distribution in this condition, with the fit to the IFD decreasing across the 5 min. This 
outcome may have been a function of the probabilistic distribution of resources as well as 
differences in competitive weight. Kraft (1999) found that resources distributed 
probabilistically resulted in undermatching of the distribution to the IFD, whether or not 
differences in competitive weight were present. Kraft speculated that discounting of 
probabilistic reinforcers may have increased the relative value o f the lean alternative 
because o f the increased probability o f obtaining something on the alternative with fewer 
competitors. While large competitive differences did emerge, distribution o f the nickels 
may have appeared somewhat random to the panhandlers because often several 
individuals asked simultaneously or nearly so.
Following the example o f Grand (1997) and Baum and Kraft (1998), an attempt was 
made to incorporate competitive weights into the regression analyses. When the Experiment 
4 regressions were redone using a distribution of competitive weights instead o f panhandlers, 
3 o f the 4 fits did not improve. This failure suggests that weights based on overall relative 
success in obtaining nickels did not reflect panhandlers’ actual competitive weights during a 
particular ratio. Kraft (1999) also found that reanalysis based on assigned competitive 
weights did not improve the fit o f the data. While Grand (1997) successfully used 
competitive weights based on differences in actual resource consumption, Baum and Kraft
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(1998) found that relative participation in the foraging situation produced a competitive 
weighting that improved the fit o f the data to the IFD. Taken together, these outcomes 
suggest that measuring functional differences in competitive weight may be idiosyncratic to 
the particular foraging situation.
Differences in competitive weights appeared to influence the distributions in other 
experiments besides those specifically addressing the effects of competitive weight. Larger 
differences in competitive weight were associated with lower sensitivities across all sessions. 
Uundermatching does not require this relationship: if  all panhandlers were equally likely to 
appear on the over-utilized lean side over the course of the session, then low sensitivity 
would co-occur with equal competitive weights. Further work examining the effects of 
competitive differences among human foragers is clearly warranted.
Experiment 5 tested the effect of violating the implicit assumption of the model that 
foragers are free to enter any habitat without interference from the presence o f other 
foragers. Interference is a function of the density of foragers in a habitat. Reduced foraging 
efficiency results from the increased interactions between foragers as numbers rise. These 
interactions may also provide opportunities for competitive differences to emerge (Baum & 
Kraft, 1998). In this experiment, group size was increased, to 14 in one session and 21 
panhandlers in another session. Both groups showed decreased sensitivity, but similar 
variance accounted for, relative to Experiment 1. However, sensitivity did not decrease 
from the 14- to the 21-panhandler session, as would be predicted if  sensitivity were 
inversely related to interference and interference increased with density. Given the 
variability in sensitivity between groups experiencing the same conditions in earlier 
experiments, the possibility that individual differences masked the effect o f increasing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
density cannot be ruled out. However, Moody and Houston (1995) reported great 
variation in the shape and slope o f interference curves across studies, suggesting that the 
relationship between density and interference may not be a simple one.
Experiment t  examined the effects o f cooperation on the distribution o f panhandlers. 
Fourteen panhandlers participated, but were expected to panhandle in pairs rather than 
individually. The procedure in the assigned partners condition assured mutualism by only 
providing nickels to the panhandlers as a pair. Additionally, the likelihood o f reciprocity 
was enhanced by self-selection of partners in a second condition.
The effects o f cooperation were clear. Fourteen panhandlers foraging 
cooperatively resulted in distributions similar to that of the 7 panhandlers in Experiment 
1, and in a much better fit to the IFD than did 14 panhandlers working individually. The 
first self-selected partners conditiori, where presumably mutualism and reciprocity were 
both high, resulted in the best fit, with near perfect conformance to the IFD.
Experiment 6 showed that the effects o f density on the distribution are likely due 
to forager interaction, since changes in interaction eliminated the effects o f increased 
density on the distribution. Given that many species, including humans, forage 
cooperatively at times, identifying the relevant foraging unit may be necessary in 
understanding the adaptation reflected in a population’s distribution across habitats. The 
present study suggests that density may play a factor in the emergence o f cooperation in a 
group, since cooperation enabled 14 panhandlers to forage more nearly optimally than 
those who worked alone.
The promising results o f the group level analyses for the 6 experiments also left 
some unanswered questions. First, could the performance o f the group be broken down
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into the aggregate o f individual or other units o f behavior? Second, within the same 
experimental condition, different groups of panhandlers distributed with varying degrees 
to the IFD, even when the assumptions of the model were met. Some groups showed 
undermatching, while others showed near perfect sensitivity. Could individual 
differences in strategies or panhandler characteristics account for this variation? A series 
o f exploratory analyses addressed these questions.
Two distinct types o f behavior emerged among the panhandlers, exclusive 
preference and switching. Although both strategies were successful, exclusive preference 
tended to be more so. As the less costly, more successful strategy, exclusive preference 
was the better choice, given some minimal number o f switches. Exclusive preference 
tended to be used slightly more often than switching. Switching also decreased over the 
course o f the session in all groups.
The distribution o f the group appeared to require sensitivity to the obtained 
resources by at least one of these strategies. However, no strong evidence was found for 
the primacy o f one strategy over the other or for the particular combination o f strategies 
needed to produce the IFD. Experimental manipulations did not appear to affect choice 
o f strategy. Sensitivity o f each strategy predicted group sensitivity, suggesting that group 
performance can be viewed as an aggregate of these two behavioral strategies. The 
attempt to extend these findings to the level o f the individual was less convincing. The 
vast majority o f panhandlers used some combination of strategies across the session. 
Tendencies toward exclusive preference, switching, or being a deadbeat, did not appear 
to affect the group tendency to distribute according to the IFD. Only drifters were 
associated with reduced sensitivity, but a reliable, causal relationship was not
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established.
These findings are suggestive, however, in a number of ways. First, a mixed ESS, 
in which different strategies with equal payoffs are used by different genotypes in the 
population, found little support in these analyses. It appears that to whatever extent 
responding leading to the IFD in the panhandling situation reflects an ESS, these data 
suggest a pure strategy that dictates different behavior in different circumstances. A 
learning rule ESS, similar to that proposed by Maynard Smith (1982), is also a 
possibility. A matching-based learning rule would have the advantage o f being 
compatible with an extensive literature demonstrating robust matching performance in 
individual animals. One direction for future work would be the development o f a 
dynamic model to build on the strategy- and individual-level findings in this study. 
Computer simulations could vary individual preferences as state variables or starting 
conditions. The relative costs and payoffs for various strategies (exclusive vs. switching, 
or the four panhandling types) could also be manipulated to see if certain strategies 
disappear or become more prevalent. The model might also predict whether there is an 
optimal combination of strategies for a given group size or resource ratio, as well as 
examine particular criteria for changing strategies. The predictions from the model could 
then be tested experimentally in the panhandling situation.
In summary, these panhandling experiments provide strong evidence that human 
adaptations can be understood through optimal foraging models. Specifically, humans 
conform to the IFD with about the same sensitivity as animals and respond similarly 
when assumptions of the model are violated. The present study also revealed that 
cooperation, and its effect on the functional size o f the foraging unit, may be an
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important factor in understanding the distribution of social foragers. Finally, the 
exploratory analyses identified strategies and panhandler characteristics that can form the 
basis for future research on how a group of animals achieves the IFD.
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1. Were you using any particular strategy when you were asking for coins?
2. What do you think this experiment was about?
3. On a scale o f 1-7, with one being the least effort you could make on this task and seven the 
most effort you could make on this task, how hard were you trying to get coins?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. How much money did you make overall in this experiment?
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF NUMBERS OF COINS USED IN VARIABLE CONDITIONS
No. of coins per cup
mean 1 2 3 4 5 6
low 0 0 0 0 4 5
variabiliy 1 2 3 5 5 6
1 2 4 5 5 6
1 3 4 5 5 6
2 3 4 5 6 7
stdev
high 0 0 0 0 0 3
variability 0 0 2 3 5 6
0 2 3 5 6 7
1 2 4 6 7 7
4 6 6 6 7 7
stdev_______________________________________________________________________ 2.725992
“Five cups were given out on each side in each minute. The columns list how many were 
in each cup during the 5 min when the ratio called for that mean number of nickels.
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